GeoThreat Corporation

GeoThreat Report

The Cellular System of ETA

Author: Dave Osborne – Threat Assessment Consultant
Produced: 2/28/2004

SAMPLE REPORT

Table of Contents

List of Figures

Overview

This report deconstructs a snapshot taken of the ETA cellular system from 1984 to assess cellular effectiveness. To do this, a contextual history detailing the environment in which the cell operates will identify strategic, operational and cultural inflections followed by localising each component of cellular capital. In addition, the intent of this report is to formulate data for later analysis.

The Contextual History of ETA

The ETA (Basque Homeland and Liberty) was formed 31 July 1959 in response to extensive Basque repression by the Franco regime[1]. Between 1973 and 1984, both Spanish counter-terrorism policies and ETA attacks perpetuated the Basque conflict. Figure 13 summarizes some of the most significant milestones, from which will be constructed a relative historical framework.

*Euzkadi (*Basque Country) represents ETA's primary area of operations. Spain controls seven territories comprising Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa, Alva and Navarra whereas France controls three territories comprising Labourd, Basse Navarre and Soule. The Spanish territories represent 86 percent of the total territory and accommodate seven percent of the Spanish population or approximately three million people[2]. The highly industrialised territories of Vizcaya and Guipuzocoa maintain the greatest percentages of Basque speakers[3]. Moreover, Guipuzocoa maintains 68 percent of the Basque population[4].

---

[1] Clark, R., *The Basque Insurgents ETA, 1952 – 1980*, Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1984, p. 26.

[2] Anderson, W., *The ETA: Spains Basque Terrorists*, New York: The Rosen Publishing Group Inc, 2003, p. 6

[3] Vizcaya and Guipuzocoa comprise 13 and 44 percent respectively of Basque speakers. Source: Clark, p. 11.

[4] Clark, p. 11.

Between 1960 and 1975, the Spanish Basque Country experienced massive immigration with the population increasing by 44 percent[5]. Consequently, Franco's dictatorship from 1936 – 1975 has represented a significant influence in shaping Basque perceptions during the post-Franco years.

Political Context

1975, Death of Franco,
1975, Carlos Arias Navarro Government

1977, 1st Democratic elections,
1977, Adolfo Suarez Government

1981, Suarez resigned,
1981, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo Government

1976-1977, Amnesty Basque prisoners

1978, Constitution Introduced

1982-1986, 1st Felipe Gonzalez Government

Counter-Terrorism Context

1975, Prevention of Terrorism Act
1975-1981, 1st Dirty war

1981, System of Repentant Terrorists and Social Reinsertion introduced

1983, Plan ZEN
1983-1987, 2nd Dirty war (GAL)

1978, 1st Counter-terrorism law Introduced

1980, Organic law 11/1980

Organic Law 9/1984,
1984, French Raids on ETA Sanctuary in Southern France Begin,
1984, Killing of Santiago Brouard the President of HASI by GAL
1984, Accomplice Evidence System introduced

ETA Context

1973 Prime Minister Luis Carrero Blanco Assassination

1978, *Herri Batasuna* Formed

1974, ETA splits into ETA (m) and ETA (p-m)

1983, ETA (p-m) Disbands

1965 onwards, continuation of *comandos* and strategy of action-repression-action

Figure 13: ETA Contextual History, 1973-1984

---

[5] Zirakzadeh, C., 'A Rebellious People: Basques, Protests, and Politics', (renamed Spain) in Whittaker, D (ed.), *The Terrorism Reader,* London: Routledge, 2001, pp. 125-138, p. 128.

Following General Francisco Franco's ascendancy to power in a 1936 coup and ensuing Spanish civil war (1936-1939), Franco introduced ultra-right unification policies[6], which became instrumental in the suppression of non-Castilian minorities. The Basque language and public shows of Basque identity were outlawed and subsequently enforced using repressive measures, which increased in intensity following the start of ETA's armed struggle in 1967. From 1968 – 1975, the Basque people experienced a build-up in security forces and multiple states of suspension[7]. For example, a three-month state of exception during November 1975 resulted in detentions, torture, abuses of the judicial system and repetitive fines causing economic hardship[8]. Consequently, Franco's ultra-right rule turned its institutions into political surrogates, particularly police and military leadership[9].

Following Franco's death and Spain's transition to Democracy, ETA violence rather than falling, increased by 93 percent[10]. In response to ETA's increasing attacks, counter-terrorism measures fluctuated between dirty wars, legislation and public shows of force. Woodworth defines the principle of Dirty War as the operation of terrorist surrogates by government officials under the umbrella of plausible deniability[11]. During both the Navarro and Suarez governments, ultra-right groups including members of the military and police carried out the first Dirty War against ETA leaders in France and their associates in Spain[12]. Since 1962, ETA leaders had used Southern France as a

---

[6] Franco pursued ultra-right policies within a framework of militarism, Catholicism, Falangism (Spanish-Fascist movement founded in 1933), capitalism and an uncrowned monarchy to guarantee supremacy. Source: Vercher, A., 'British and Spanish Measures to Deal With Terrorism: A Comparative Study with Some Reference to the EEC Framework', PhD Thesis, Cambridge University, 1988, p. 194.

[7] States of suspension resulted in suspending Basque constitutional rights for two to six month periods. Source: Clark, p. 241

[8] Vercher, p. 223.

[9] Woodworth, P., *Dirty War, Clean Hands: ETA, the Gal and Spanish Democracy*, Crosses Green Cork, Ireland: Cork University Press, 2001, p. 47.

[10] Zirakzadeh, p. 126.

[11] Woodworth, p. 46.

[12] Attacks by ultra-rights used cover names such as counter-terrorism ETA (ATE) an inversion of ETA. Source: Woodworth, p. 48.

sanctuary[13]. The second dirty war followed in 1982 under Felipe Gonzalez's Socialist government, enacted through the *Grupos Antiterroristas de liberacion* (GAL) proxy organisation.

The 1975 Prevention of Terrorism Act activated various terrorism laws dictating police and judicial action, essentially criminalizing the conflict[14]. Additional organic laws reinforced Spanish strategy between 1980 and 1984, underscored by the introduction of the Italian system of *pentiti*: the system of the Repentant Terrorists in 1981[15]. Additionally, the Spanish government launched Plan ZEN (Special Northern Zone) in 1983[16] increasing security force numbers intensifying the climate of occupation[17]. In contrast to the Spanish evolution from ultra-right policies to criminalizing the conflict, the ETA were influenced by schisms and organisational splits, which as Clark states, '…emerged each time radicalised, more intransigent and more deeply committed to armed struggle.' [18]

Between 1967 and 1978, ETA's ideology evolved into a mix of Socialism and ethno-nationalism causing multiple schisms and organisational splits[19]. Throughout these splits, the nationalist discourse remained separatist[20]. The Patriotic Socialist Coordinating Council (KAS) created in 1975 produced the following minimum conditions for ETA's abandonment of violence: the right of self-determination; to assert territorial integrity for all Basque provinces in Spain; the institutional predominance of the Basque language; amnesty for all political prisoners; and the withdraw of all

---

[13] Clark, p. 37.
[14] Jimenez, F., 'Spain: The Terrorist Challenge and the Government's Response' in Schmid, A and Crelinsten, R (eds), *Western Responses to Terrorism,* London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1993, pp. 110-130, p. 117.
[15] Vercher, p. 276.
[16] Woodworth, p. 68.
[17] ibid.
[18] Clark, p. 35.
[19] Clark, p. 36.
[20] Mees, L., 'Between Votes and Bullets: Conflicting Ethnic Identities in the Basque Country', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 24:5 (2001), pp. 798-827, p. 807.

Spanish security services[21]. Franco's denial of individual identity ultimately resulted in the armed struggle linking the ETA as defender of Basque rights. Subsequently, the ETA cellular system became an effective means to pursue the armed struggle.

The ETA cell (*comando*) developed during a period of organisational perturbations spanning from 1962 – 1971. The *comando* has its roots in the social institutions of Basque village culture[22], particularly the cellular grouping of *cuadrillas* comprising male groups of four to six men who had maintained close relationships since childhood[23]. Cellular groupings were integrated into the ETA beginning from the First Assembly meeting of the executive in 1962 and subsequently refined during later assemblies. Full-time members (*liberados*) were introduced in 1964, 3-5 member *comandos* introduced in 1965 followed by assigning *comandos* to village clusters between 1966 and 1967[24]. These events established the cell as the key-operating core of the ETA. In addition to this early period of organisational formation, ETA introduced a new strategy.

From 1965 – 1984, the ETA employed the spiral theory of 'action-repression-action'[25]. This strategy originated from a third world guerrilla strategy of revolutionary warfare and states,

> …when popular protest against injustices met with oppression, the revolutionary forces should act to punish the oppressor. The occupying forces would then retaliate with indiscriminate violence, since they would not know who the revolutionaries were, causing the population to respond with increased protests and support for the resistance in an upward spiral of resistance to the dictatorship[26].

---

[21] Zirakzadeh, p. 126.
[22] Clark, p. 209.
[23] Clark, p. 162.
[24] Clark, p. 208.
[25] Alexander, Y., Swetnam, M. and Levine, H., *ETA: Profile of a Terrorist Group*, New York: Transnational Publishers, 2001, p. 6.
[26] Sullivan, J., *ETA and Basque Nationalism: The Fight for Euskadi 1890-1986*, London: Routledge, 1988, p. 43.

Essentially, for every police reaction, ETA would provoke an even greater response during which time a parallel system of administration would gradually supersede governmental processes and eventually lead to revolution[27]. The 1974 assassination of Franco's successor Prime Minister Carrero Blanco, while representative of this strategy, however acted to accelerate ETA's most definitive split in its history[28].

In 1974, internal divisions over the role of the armed struggle caused the ETA to split into ETA (m) (military) and ETA (p-m) (political-military)[29]. However, ETA (m) superseded ETA (p-m)[30], which eventually disbanded in 1983[31]. Additionally, in 1978 ETA's political wing *Herri Batasuna* (HB) formed from an amalgamation of four left-wing Basque parties becoming the mouthpiece for ETA and a magnet for radicalism at the local level[32].

The historical framework ending in 1984 offsets Spain's criminalization strategy against ETA's escalation strategy. Moreover, this framework identifies Basque social networks as integral to ETA's cellular system. The next three sections will use this framework to assist in the deconstruction of the ETA cellular system. Moreover, unless otherwise specified ETA refers to ETA (m). However, in some cases statistics supplied by Clark do not differentiate between ETA (m) and ETA (p-m). Subsequently, the reader must be aware that ETA (p-m) was less active militarily vis-à-vis ETA (m)[33]. See appendix A for research definitions associated to the next three sections.

---

[27] ibid.
[28] Clark, p. 78.
[29] ETA (p-m) envisioned the arrival of a more democratic system and elected to subordinate the armed struggle in favour of mass organisation.
Source: Clark, p. 80.
[30] Clark, p. 81.
[31] Woodworth, p. 64.
[32] Clark, p. 109.
[33] Clark, p. 128.

The Main Actors of ETA

During 1984, ETA's organisational structure reflected a two-tier construct (see Figure 14) networked together by a comprehensive courier network. This section will first, examine the organisational structure of the ETA *comando* and second, the actors that influence it.

The ETA *comando* was organised according to four specialised structures subordinated to the military apparatus and controlled by commanders that sat on the executive committee. *Comando* specialisations consisted of logistics, communications, intelligence and attack roles. The first three cell structures consisted mostly of part-time members (*legales*) who traditionally did not participate in armed actions and were generally unknown to the security forces.

Intelligence cell roles (*Informativo*) comprised of information collection and development, which included tactical considerations and best method, time and place considerations for future targets[34].

Logistics or support cell roles (*apoyo*) comprised of bomb making, document forging, providing transportation and safe houses, and raising finances[35]. Moreover, cross-border cells transported *materiels* between Southern France and Spain[36].

Communication cells can be categorised as couriers and drop points. The courier or link (*enlace*) was an intermediary that transported messages or weapons both hierarchically and horizontally. Vertical communications existed between the leadership, drop-points and *comando* leaders[37]. Horizontal communications existed between *comando* leaders and drop-points. The drop-points or mailboxes (*buzons*) could be another courier or

---

[34] Alexander, Swetnam and Levine, p. 8.
[35] Anderson, p. 45.
[36] Alexander, Swetnam and Levine, p. 8.
[37] Clark, p. 231.

physical locations, such as bars or cinemas[38]. The sensitivity of the courier package determined the kind of courier used. For example, carrying revolutionary taxes to the leadership would have a different level of priority vis-à-vis a package of explosives transported to a *commando liberado*.

The attack *comando* comprised three to five fulltime (*liberados*) members (herein *etarras*) overseen by a commander who sat on the executive committee. The commander of the *liberados* had several personal staff to assist with managing the *comandos*, which included assistants responsible for finance, cross-border operations, operations management and finally logistical support and training[39]. Each *liberado* had a Basque codename or *nom de guerre* and generally had a police record[40]. The *comando* carried out armed actions mostly operating on intelligence provided by the leadership[41].

C*omandos liberados* appear traditionally assigned to clusters of villages[42]. By referring to attack-victim distribution indexes provided by Clark, *comandos* operated from Guipuzcoa, Vizcaya, Madrid, Alava and finally Navarra[43]. Attacks tend to cluster around municipalities and townships[44]. According to Clark, the main distribution of *comandos* appears localised between west-central Vizcaya and the southeast and south central of Guipuzcoa[45]. These facts imply *comandos* operated regionally.

The executive committee operated with a staff of seven men allocated to the following specific departments[46]: *comandos liberados*, *comandos legales*, intelligence, propaganda, political dissemination and international operations[47]. The political

---

[38] Clark, p. 211.
[39] Clark, p. 213.
[40] Clark, p. 209.
[41] Zulaika, J., *Basque Violence Metaphor and Sacrament*, Nevada, U.S.A: University of Nevada Press, 1988, p. 69.
[42] Clark, p. 209.
[43] Clark, p. 186.
[44] Clark, p. 189.
[45] Clark, p. 190.
[46] Clark, p. 212.
[47] Clark, p. 213.

department was responsible for the ideological training of new recruits and to ensure armed operations followed party lines[48]. The propaganda department, while responsible for press releases also conducted the continued ideological training of *etarras*[49]. The international operations department was responsible for establishing and maintaining foreign relationships[50]. In contrast to the organisational construct, popular support provides a crucial indicator of ETA's activities and subsequent support received by ETA *comandos*.

Most terrorist organisations strive for popular support and attempt to maximise it through their strategy[51]. The ETA is particularly dependent on securing a broad and increasing support base to insulate itself against counter-terrorism measures and achieve the end goals of its escalation strategy. Therefore, the level of popular support becomes a barometer for the success of the strategy. For example, non-members may demonstrate support by providing safe houses or even acting as low-level couriers[52]. Consequently, popular support primarily influences leadership and recruitment. In contrast, ETA prisoners have a symbolic influence.

ETA's political prisoners are the most visible symbol of state repression[53]. Between October 1978 and May 1981 350 *etarras* were tried and found guilty of 428 criminal acts and sentenced to an average of 3.4 years per person[54]. Mata characterises both ETA's political prisoners and the *Kale borroka*[55] or military

---

[48] Clark, p. 214.
[49] ibid.
[50] Clark, p. 215.
[51] Irvin, C., *Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Part in Ireland and the Basque Country*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999, p. 45.
[52] Anderson, p. 42.
[53] Irvin, p. 147.
[54] Clark, p. 259.
[55] *Kale borroka* is a Basque phrase meaning 'path of combat'. This translation however interprets it as ETA's military wing.
Source: Mata, J., 'A Long History at the Limits of legality Batasuna: The Strategy of Insurrection', *El Pais*, 18th August (2002) retrieved October 2002, from the archives of El Pais Digital www.elpais.es, translated by Brian Hamly on 1 May 2003

wing as being among '…the attitudes, beliefs and characteristics which give cohesion to this radical setting and which can characterize its members [ETA]…'*[56]* Prisoners can be considered part of the ETA strategy to target other movements in order to maximise popular support. However, as Sullivan comments an increasing prison population may also reduce the morale of *etarras*[57]. Nevertheless, prisoners provide propaganda value primarily to encourage popular support. In contrast, ETA's political wing *Herri Batsauna* (HB) influences the survivability of *etarras*.

HB while expressing support for ETA's ideology and armed struggle offers an alternative organisation and parapolitical strategy of activism[58]. Essentially, HB provides an additional exit route for *etarras* who have outlived their usefulness as combatants. According to Irvin's study of HB activists, at least 20 percent originated from ETA[59]. Consequently, HB mainly influences the lifecycle of the etarra (see Figure 21).

Popular support and the organisational construct constitute major actors influencing the ETA *comando*. HB and the ETA prisoners are minor actors being somewhat less influential but remaining vital actors in the overall cellular system. These actors represent major sources of dynamic influences shaping the ETA organisation. The following six sections further project the influence of each actor as each component of cell effectiveness is localised.

---

[56] Mata, Internet.
[57] Sullivan, p. 279.
[58] Khatami, S., 'Between Class and Nation: Ideology and Radical Basque Ethnonationalism', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 20:4 (1997), pp. 395-417, p. 402.
[59] Irvin, p. 145.

Figure 14: Actors influencing the ETA Cellular System

Compartmentalization and Tradition

This section primarily examines solidarity and how it shapes internal compartmentalization (see Figure 15). In addition, both operational and territorial compartmentalization are each addressed when examining communications discipline. These factors assist in shaping the cells secrecy, which contributes to cell effectiveness. Within a *comando*, solidarity has the following primary bonding characteristics: village traditions, symbolism and the *ekintza* (ordeal by fire).

The social traditions of Basque villages are ideally suited for the formation of *comandos*. The c*uadrilla* is a village tradition consisting of groups of four to six boys whose friendship continues through to adulthood. Clark comments that during their teenage years the *cuadrilla* becomes more organised, and as they enter adulthood, the men may develop '…stronger ties to the cuadrilla than to their own families.'[60] For example, Zulaika's ethnographical study of the Basque village Itziar and its local ETA *comando* described the *etarras* as childhood friends that participated in similar

---

[60] Clark, p. 162.

recreational activities eventually joining activist organisations before entering the ETA[61].

Prior activism is a common factor among many *etarras*. Irvin identifies various pathways before joining HB, the most significant being protests in support of amnesty for ETA prisoners[62]. However, exposure to violence, discrimination and political motivations additionally influenced the common experience. For example, amongst members of the Itzair *comando*, the idealism of the Catholic Church, such as equality and justice, had been linked with Marxism producing the political motivation to join ETA[63]. In addition to village institutions, public funerals for slain ETA leaders became mainstay events for developing solidarity.

The ETA's use of funerals produced enormous propaganda value for both supporters and *etarras*. An example is the funeral of senior ETA leader Mikel GoiKoetxea Elorriage following his assassination by the GAL. It was designed as political theatre including chants, speeches and symbolic acts such as his widow holding the ETA's serpent and axe aloft[64]. Woodworth states, 'The liberation language of individual and social transformation was blinding with the language of militant resurrection, an apocalyptic ideological cocktail of intoxicating potency to many young Basques.'[65] This political ritualisation as Woodworth comments energises the combat with ritual power[66].

The ritual element of combat for the *etarra* is *ekintza*, defined as the '…ordeal by fire in which you test your personality.' The *ekintza* develops as an armed

---

[61] Zulaika, p. 62.
[62] Irvin, p. 145.
[63] Zulaika, p. 63.
[64] The serpent indicates cunning and the axe indicates strength.
Source: Woodworth, p. 98.
[65] Woodworth, p. 98.
[66] ibid.

action constantly challenging the *etarra*, causing satisfaction, producing courage and likened to acquiring a warrior identity[67]. Zulaika states that the '..."ordeal by fire" that the ekintza implies became the backdrop against which everything was measured.'[68] A successful *ekintza* produced positive reinforcement within the *comando*. Achieving this end was particularly dependent on the discipline of the *etarra*.

The 'need to know' philosophy determined the extent of *etarra* discipline. Clark comments that the *etarras* knew maybe one or two other *etarras* outside of the *comando*[69]. This is indicative of individual attacks being widely spread over time. For example, the Itzair *comando* carried out six killings between 1975 and 1980[70]. The isolation of the *comando* intensified the internal and external ideological behaviour sustaining the solidarity of the *comando* over long periods[71]. For example, the Itzair *comando* learnt more about the ETA while under police interrogation than at any other time[72]. Consequently, long-term social bonds suggest a high degree of discipline within the *comando liberados*. However, statistics for dismantled *comandos* would indicate some disciplinary weakness did occur, particularly among *comandos legales*.

The Spanish Ministry of Interior lists 30 *comandos*[73] of mainly *comando legales* dismantled by the *Guardia Civil* between 1978 and 1984[74]. Analysis by Clark of

---

[67] Zulaika, p. 68.
[68] The *ekintza* could produce a degree of unconsciousness to the point of psychological fearlessness, which could turn life in the ETA into a source of *juerga* (fun time).
Source: Zulaika, pp. 67-68.
[69] Clark, p. 210.
[70] Zulaika, p. xvii.
[71] Irvin, p. 45.
[72] Zulaika, p. 69.
[73] Spanish Civil Guard Statistics – Dismantled *Comandos* Statistics retrieved 1 August 2003, from http://www.guardiacivil.org/terrorismo/estadisticas3.asp
[74] *Guardia Civil* Figures are different from Clarks. Clark uses a 1981 police report to suggest that over 400 *comandos* were broken-up between 1978 and 1980.
Source: Clark, p. 210.
However, this Figure appears quite inflated. By estimating four *etarras* per *comando,* Clark's statistics would approximate some 1,600 *etarra* prisoners by the end of 1980. Spanish statistics indicate that at the end of 1980 only 477 *etarras* were imprisoned or approximately 100 or so cells.
Source: Spanish Civil Guard Statistics – Detained ETA Member Statistics retrieved 1 August 2003, from http://www.guardiacivil.org/terrorismo/estadisticas5.asp

214 arrest records between January 1979 and June 1980, shows that 56.5 percent of those arrested were *liberados*[75]. Additionally, Trevino comments in his study of Basque security forces that many of those arrested tended to be *legales*[76] whereas Clark quotes from a press report '…that there were as many support comandos or cells as there were liberados…'[77] Moreover, arrest rates of between 23 and 178 Basques per month between 1978 and 1984 suggest a potentially significant attrition rate[78]. While increased numbers of *legales* increased their chances of capture, their weakness for arrest also suggests a reduced degree of discipline vis-à-vis *comando liberados*.

Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for compartmentalization:

1. Leadership flexibility sustains the *comandos ekintza,* which reinforces solidarity
2. Leadership partly controlled low-level selective targeting to reinforce the *etarras* commitment, which following successful attacks generated pride and increased solidarity
3. Commitment increases solidarity caused by the ineffective over reaction of security forces
4. The ETA's high degree of integration into the Basque community produced a broad popular support base increasing attack effectiveness and reinforcing solidarity
5. Recruitment filtering reinforced solidarity through common experience
6. Conscience raising and the development of the *ekintza* during training produced high initiation and exit costs, increasing isolation which increased solidarity
7. Effective operational intelligence, abundant weaponry and tactical variety increased attack effectiveness, which reinforced solidarity
8. Successful counter-terrorism measures increased the isolation of cells, which increased solidarity

The compartmentalization of an ETA *comando* infers both a strong tradition and ritual based element in forming solidarity. Feedback influences reinforce these

---

[75] Clark, p. 212.
[76] Trevino, J., 'Spain's Internal Security: The Basque Autonomous Police Force' in Alexander, Y and Myers, K (eds), *Terrorism in Europe*, London: Croom Helm,   1982, pp. 141-153, p. 143.
[77] Clark, p. 212.
[78] Clark, p. 263.

contributory parts, primarily using control, attack effectiveness and counter-terrorism measures to accommodate the particular patterns of each *comando*. The discipline of the *comandos legales* appears to be a weakness, however it is difficult to assess whether their high attrition rate is a fault of culture and/or counter-terrorism measures. Overall, the ETA *comando* supports a high degree of secrecy and therefore positively influences cell effectiveness to a high degree.


Figure 15: ETA Systems Decomposition of Compartmentalization

Leadership and Political Efficacy

This section will primarily examine the leadership's role in determining decentralisation of control (see Figure 16). In addition, selective targeting is examined as a manifestation of the organisations strategy and subsequently the survivability of the ETA *comando*. These factors focus on leadership influences that shape cell formation and operation, which help determine cell effectiveness.

The two-tier leadership structure of ETA suggests a high degree of leadership centralisation. Leadership centralisation determines leadership stability and subsequently, the manifestation of ideology into strategy resulting in decentralisation of operational control. Leadership stability is essentially dependent on leadership proximity to the war-zone and composition.

From 1974 onwards, the ETA's sanctuary in Southern France was under threat[79]. In 1974 the ETA were banned in France, by 1977 Basques sheltering in Southern France had lost political refugee status[80]and by 1984 etarras could be extradited to Spain[81]. However, during this period, the French targeted Basque refuges in general rather than the ETA leadership in particular[82]. Consequently, during 1984 French security forces did little to disrupt ETA's leadership activities[83].

Clark's assessment of ETA's 1980 executive committee indicates a common theme of national radicalism developed during the period of Franco, with many

---

[79] The exact locations of the ETA leadership are unknown, however Clark suggests they were located in and around the four French Basque towns of St-Jean-de-Luz, Hendaye, Bayonne and Biarritz.
Source: Clark, p. 215.
[80] Clark, p. 216.
[81] ibid.
[82] ibid.
[83] Clark comments that in 1981 the French government and the ETA had an uneasy and unofficial truce reliant on the extent of ETA's activities.
Source: Clark, p. 218.

having prior active participation in ETA attacks[84]. Moreover, ETA's ideological splits and several reorganisations would have ensured a high degree of ideological consistency. Consequently, the proximity of leadership to the war-zone and its composition resulted in a high degree of leadership stability. However, the leadership's operational control from Southern France was reflected in its two-tier control structure.

The executive committee, rather than decentralising control through multiple layers of leadership instead developed an extensive network of couriers allowing the fine-tuning of strategy. The ETA's two-tier leadership structure produced less flexibility in manipulating the degree of control allocated to lower levels vis-à-vis a multi-tier layer. Subsequently, the ETA's leadership structure is less dependent on ideological stability to maintain subsequent layers of leadership. In this sense, while Southern France codifies ideology into strategy, over time the strategy can be adapted to changing political conditions or needs.

The ETA's strategy connects abstract beliefs from its ethno-nationalist ideology with concrete actions. The resulting 'action-repression-action' strategy strives to maximise popular support through escalation by encouraging state overreaction. It sets geographical boundaries and targeting direction.

The French Basque territories are allocated as the support zone providing rest and recuperation areas and are used to coordinate all operational activities, including logistics, training, information gathering and attack authorisations[85]. Based on attack statistics the Spanish Basque territories, particularly Guipuzcoa, and the Spanish capital Madrid represent ETA's primary war-zones[86].

---

[84] At least five of the seven leaders had participated in previous attacks.
Source: Clark, p. 212.
[85] Woodworth, p. 68.
[86] Clark, p. 186.

Political efficacy determines targeting direction. The aim of political efficacy is to maximise ETA's supporter base by winning new and maintaining existing support. Targeting direction places limits on the tactics used which puts emphasis on short-term objectives, protecting resources and feeding the ideology within the *comando* to sustain long-term commitment. This strategy puts pressure on the organisations capacity to absorb counter-terrorism measures. Sullivan comments that the gulf between strategic theory and resources made escalation impossible[87].

The attempt to escalate the ETA campaign between 1981 and 1982, '…exacerbated extremism within the armed forces and police.'[88] Irvin states, '…the leadership's ability to recruit members depends on the application of the strategy: if it loses credibility, both the leadership and the organisation are vulnerable to defectors.'[89] Subsequently, security force overreaction including employing right wing elements (GAL), interrogation and particularly, the policy of repentant terrorists countered ETA's escalation strategy. Consequently, leadership centralisation, primarily its proximity to the areas of operation, and the 'action-repression-action' strategy emphasising escalation, are crucial factors in determining the degree of control devolved to ETA *comandos*.

The decentralisation of control correlates to the maintenance of organisational cohesion and flexibility. While the *comando* could choose the target, authorisation from leadership was required before carrying out the operation[90]. Moreover, the *comando* was dependent on the apparatus in Southern France for logistics support[91]. Zualika comments that the Itzair *comando* once it had earned its own status ignored any intermediary and preferred direct contact with ETA leadership: 'The cell would choose objectives on its own initiative and simply ask permission to carry them out; a phone

---

[87] Sullivan, p. 70.
[88] During 1980, the ETA killed 32 *Guardia Civil*.
Source: Woodworth, p. 63.
[89] Irvin, p. 23.
[90] Zulaika, p. 69.
[91] Clark, p. 232.

call was sufficient for that.'[92] An inference from this example is that direct contact with the ETA leadership was dependent on the *comandos* practical needs and the pattern it developed within ETA[93]. The ETA leadership structure appears rather flexible in this respect. However, a degree of coercion also defined the boundaries of control.

Clark comments that most *etarras* could expect to serve three years on active service before exiting the organisation[94]. The acceptance of government programs such as social reinsertion, was however, not considered a harmless means of exit. Accepting social reinsertion represented a betrayal of ETA's revolutionary ideology and a failure of the revolutionary conscience, especially when committed by leaders[95]. Overall, the use of decentralisation of control ensures cohesion, however it also overlaps somewhat with selective targeting and the survivability of the cell.

Political efficacy within the context of selective targeting refers to the maximising of support under the parasol of an escalating conflict. Irvin quotes an HB activist explaining the essence of political efficacy: 'Our strength, but also our dilemma is that many [people] turn out for our marches because they support ETA. So ETA needs us, and we need ETA. But we need an ETA that is very, very careful in its operations.'[96] The doctrine of ETA favours political efficacy through surgical strikes, such as assassinations and selective targeting, which can be categorised into high, low and symbolic levels of profiling.

High profile targeting transmits ETA's ideological message, demonstrates its commitment and intends to guarantee a disproportionate response. The targets chosen are representative of their high profile links to the Spanish government, crucial roles within the security forces, or perceived betrayal of the ETA. High

---

[92] Zulaika, p. 69.
[93] ibid.
[94] Clark, p. 165.
[95] Woodworth, p. 104.
[96] Irvin, p. 164.

profile targets generally included higher military echelons[97], local politicians and members of the judiciary[98]. Moreover, informers were targeted for betraying the ideological position of the organisation[99]. The leadership designates high profile targets with attacks planned in detail, and sometimes well in advance. For example, the planning for the assassination of Spanish Prime Minister Carrero Blanco on 20 December 1974 began in 1972[100].

Low profile targeting through the systematic targeting of security forces maintains ETA's strategic tempo and visibility. The typical assassination according to Zirakzadeh is rank-and-file policemen[101]. Trevino adds: 'ETA labels them visible tools of "repression"…these attacks are becoming not only more numerous but also more and more systematic.'[102] Brotons and Esposito note that of the 796 persons killed by the ETA between 1968 and 1999, 46 percent were police[103]. The next highest were civilians at 37 percent[104]. Regular Basque civilians[105] were not generally targeted however the indiscriminate nature of bombings would likely have contributed to the civilian death toll[106].

Symbolic targeting projects a message of power to specific audiences. The propaganda value of symbolic targeting concentrated on discouraging and sometimes exploiting Basque affiliations with the Spanish. Of particular symbolic value were Basque businessmen and *etarras* who accepted social-reinsertion. Basque businessmen provide

---

[97] Clark, p. 137.
[98] Anderson, W., *The ETA: Spains Basque Terrorists*, New York: The Rosen Publishing Group Inc, 2003, p. 47.
[99] Clark, p. 137.
[100] Clark, p. 70.
[101] Zirakzadeh, p. 134.
[102] Trevino, p. 143.
[103] Brotons, A and Esposito, C., 'Spain' in Alexander, Y (ed.), *Combating Terrorism*, London: Croom Helm, 1982, pp. 163-186, p. 175.
[104] Brotons and Esposito, p. 175.
[105] Targeting of civilians linked to the Spanish occupation, including families of the security forces, still occurred, as this was believed conducive to security force overreaction.
Source: Sullivan, p. 259.
[106] Woodworth, p. 117.

a lucrative financial source through either kidnappings or by paying revolutionary taxes[107]. They equated to collaborators, who through association, contributed to the suppression of the Basque culture[108]. For example, between 1978 and 1980 the ETA attacked nine businessmen for failing to pay revolutionary taxes[109]. However, ETA's reliance on revolutionary taxes and kidnappings is contingent on a ready supply of businessmen, requiring careful targeting to ensure businessmen remain in the Basque region[110]. In contrast, terrorists who accepted social reinsertion were an immediate threat to the ideological foundations of the organisation[111].

In 1986, 107 ETA (m) members[112] benefited from the policy of social-reinsertion. ETA described those who accepted social reinsertion as losing their revolutionary conscience and displaying individual egotism[113]. Essentially, this form of targeting demonstrates ETA's ideological commitment as well as dissuading *etarras* from this form of exit. While leadership are extremely influential in managing strategy during the selective targeting process, they were also necessary in developing foreign relationships.

The ETA's multiple contacts with foreign terrorist organisations and sympathetic countries allowed for the exchange of ideas, training and attachment to supply sources. Alexander, Swetnam and Levine point to ETA contacts with numerous other terrorist organisations[114]. For example, the Uruguayan Tupamaros taught *etarras* kidnapping techniques[115]. Moreover, Clark comments that the ETA has received training from various countries, such as Algeria, who have taught bomb-making skills to *etarras*[116]. However, ETA's foreign network, while of importance for the exchange of ideas, does

---

[107] Zirakzadeh, p. 133.
[108] Khatami, p. 397.
[109] Clark, p. 228.
[110] Alexander, Swetnam and Levine, p. 30.
[111] Vercher, p. 297.
[112] ibid.
[113] Woodworth, p. 104.
[114] Alexander, Swetnam and Levine, p. 23.
[115] ibid.
[116] ibid.

not appear as essential for its logistics network. Clark states, 'The weapons traditionally employed by ETA's commandos are relatively easy to master, and its doubtful that etarras really had to go all the way to Algeria to learn how to fire a Sten sub machinegun.'[117] ETA's sanctuary in Southern France and its proximity to the rest of Europe tended to counter the need for an extensive network of foreign supporters.

Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for leadership:

1. Leaders can use popular support as a barometer to assess local conditions
2. Counter-Terrorism measures disrupted French based leadership activities (-)

In summary, ETA's leadership orchestrates escalation through short-term actions by carefully controlling the political efficacy of attacks. It achieves control through a strong courier network and a mix of selective targeting authorised by leadership but dependent on assigning control based on accommodating the patterns of different *comandos*. While ETA's strategy was detrimental to its long-term goals, its influence at lower-levels appears to have done little to degrade cell effectiveness in the short-term[118]. Overall, leadership positively influences cell effectiveness to a high degree.

---

[117] Clark, p. 234.

[118] The ETA still carried out 194 acts during 1984. However, more research is required to ultimately determine the influence the failing ETA strategy and GAL threat had on ETA *comandos*.

Figure 16: ETA Systems Decomposition of Leadership

Commitment and Ekintza

This section primarily examines the ideology of the ETA and to what extent it translates into commitment (see Figure 17). In this analysis, the *etarras* self-concept of *ekintza* represents a central motivating factor of cell effectiveness.

The ETA through its discourse emphasises the importance of developing a revolutionary conscience to provide justifications for objectives and commitment to different degrees of action. The 1976 Seventh Assembly linked the social and nationalist struggle to the revolutionary ETA declaring it the vanguard organisation for the defence of Basque rights and hence, fight for Basque self-determination[119]. Justifications for these objectives develop through the continuing legacy of repression, the threat to Basque culture, ideological dogmatism and the *ekintza*.

Mees comments that Basque society developed from a history in which being a nationalist has always been a way of life and from which the separatist discourse has never disappeared[120]. By instigating a culture of violence in the Basque Country Franco produced an adversarial state in which ETA's response was morally justifiable. For example, Franco's decision to build nuclear power plants in Basque country was an affront to Basque sovereignty resulting in symbolic ETA attacks on the Lemoniz power station from 1977 – 1982[121]. Spanish repression resulted in ETA's supporters declaring hatred against all Spanish state representatives, the self-identification of being Basque and anti-Spanish, a hatred for the security forces and the rejection of all non-ETA leadership[122]. Ultimately Spanish repression translates into the failure of external rule, whether by totalitarian or representative democracy. Sullivan states, 'The criteria for being recognised as Basque becomes allegiance to nationalism itself.'[123] Consequently,

---

[119] Irvin, p. 151.
[120] Mees, pp. 805-807.
[121] Irvin, p. 146.
[122] Mata, Internet.
[123] Sullivan, p. 273.

the Basques intrinsic affiliation to nationalism only encourages its beliefs as a race apart from the Castilian majority.

The ethnicity of the Basque people forms the basis of ETA's ideology. The use of the Basque language has been a valuable political symbol within this context. Irvin states, 'It is, in essence, a struggle for the survival of a culture whose most distinguishing features, its language, has been threatened with extinction for both economic, demographic and political reasons.'[124] Irvin's study of HB activists identified 40 percent of the interview sample as Basque speakers, which demonstrated the significant role ethnicity played in the nationalist struggle[125]. Subsequently, ETA's discourse has seemingly progressed to socialism in order to link its ideology to unequal rights and the criticism of urban and commercial society[126]. Consequently, continuing repression results in an anti-repressive and anti-Spanish revolutionary conscience perpetuated by the surrounding social conditions. Moreover, ideological dogmatism strengthens the development of revolutionary conscience.

ETA's ideological dogmatism, perpetuated by surrounding social conditions, continues to validate its strategy[127]. Woodworth comments: 'The core members of ETA were convinced that any compromise on full independence was tantamount to betrayal, or even collaboration with "genocide".'[128] In addition, Irvin claims that the majority of core HB activists seek purely nationalist objectives[129]. Ideological dogmatism makes the ETA an intransigent organisation to negotiate with, which legitimises the strategy of the armed struggle[130]. Moreover, symbolism such as the organisation's militaristic language, associated myths and martyrs continue to demonstrate the organisations

---

[124] Irvin, p. 203.
[125] Irvin, p. 137.
[126] Zirakzadeh, p. 133.
[127] Khatami, p. 412.
[128] Genocide in this sense refers to preventing the Basque language from dying out.
Source: Woodworth, p. 51.
[129] Irvin, p. 168.
[130] Khatami, p. 397.

commitment and dogmatic affirmation to its social and ethno-nationalist ideology[131]. Ultimately dogmatism ensures message clarity and legitimisation in the long-term, however, its failure to adapt to changing political conditions may reduce organisational flexibility resulting in outdated exit and voice constructs[132]. While revolutionary conscience and symbolism provide justification for acts the concept of *ekintza* through acts carried out against, Spanish security forces determined the backdrop for which everything, including commitment, was measured.

Making *ekintza* was a readiness to act out commitment as far as possible[133]. In this sense, it is a ritual, converting words and intentions into reality. According to Zuilaka, it '…was never a conquered state of behaviour but a no-mans land which gave one courage to either jump forward or shrink back.'[134] For example, while risks were high, features displayed within the Itzair *comando* consisted of unconsciousness and sometimes, fearless action[135]. Commitment became an attitude of *bizitza jokatu* (to bet one's life) and a duty rather than a sacrifice[136]. The resulting self-concept of *ekintza* could provide the self-justification for all manner of attacks. For example, the Itzair *comando* kidnapped and killed a Basque industrialist who was a friend of the kidnappers[137]. The *ekintza* symbolises the ultimate commitment or complete life surrender to the ETA[138].

Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for commitment:

1. ETA's strategic tempo and resulting ineffective overreaction by the security forces reinforced the commitment of *etarras*

---

[131] Mata, Internet.
[132] Crenshaw, M., 'Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organisational Approaches' in Rapport, D (ed.), *Inside Terrorist Organisations*, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001, pp. 13-31, p. 22.
[133] Zulaika, p. 39.
[134] Zulaika, p. 68.
[135] ibid.
[136] Zulaika, p. 185.
[137] Zulaika, p. 87.
[138] Zulaika, p. 185.

2. Decentralisation of control or volition helps justify the act to the *etarra*
3. Selective targeting signifies the importance of the act to the *etarra* reinforcing commitment
4. The recruitment period of a volunteer incrementally increases commitment through conscience raising and *ekintzas*
5. Tactical variety increases attack effectiveness reinforcing commitment
6. The Spanish counter-terrorism policy of social-reinsertion undermined the ideology of the ETA (-)

The overall emphasis of ETA's ethno-nationalist ideology is to inculcate social conditions with a revolutionary context. The ethnic element forms the basis for this ideology. However, the ritual of *ekintza* adds a powerful dimension of commitment allowing most acts to be made meaningful to the self, especially when carried out in the intimate surrounds of one's local village[139]. These beliefs are translated into varying degrees of commitment, which can be described as an incremental adjustment of commitment from uncommitted, to supporter and finally to *etarra*. Overall, commitment positively influences cell effectiveness to a high degree.

---

[139] Zulaika, p. 97.

Figure 17: ETA Systems Decomposition of Commitment

Popular Support and Village Integration

This section will primarily examine the extent of ETA's popular support and how this translates into sanctuaries (see Figure 18). In adition, ETA's integration of village social networks will be shown as a key factor in generating sanctuaries to maintain cell effectiveness.

The ETA is an ethno-nationalist organisation that depends mostly on a single ethnic group. The composition of the supporter base is both ethnic and immigrant Basque spread across various social strata, including working, lower and middle classes[140]. To broaden its supporter base the ETA has used the tactic of 'the accumulation of strength' or infiltration of various sector organisations.

Single-issue organisations such as labour movements, student groups or anti-military organisations once infiltrated add to the accumulation of conflicts. Mata states, 'The role that they should play, according to the guidelines emanating from their source, is that relating to their particular field or sector of action, with the possibility of interchanging and multiplying the militancy among the various groups.'[141] By infiltrating these organisations, ETA also prevents the emergence of competitors. Basque support for ETA is primarily concentrated in Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa the later providing ETA's core support[142].

Survey results indicate ETA has a supporter base of between 12 and 15 percent[143]. Clark's collation of six surveys between 1975 and 1982 indicates from three to six percent of adults (56,900 – 97,000) represents a hardcore that advocates violence[144]. Two surveys, one in 1979 and another in 1981 indicate a hardcore of 12 percent or

---

[140] Clark, p. 184.
[141] Mata, Internet.
[142] Clark, p. 192.
[143] Clark, p. 182 and Woodworth, P., 'Why Do They Kill? The Basque Conflict in Spain', *World Policy Journal*, Spring (2001), pp. 1-12, p. 7.
[144] Clark, p. 170.

195,000 adults who strongly favour independence[145]. Moreover, surveys carried out between 1978 and 1981 to determine attitudes towards the ETA identified between 13 and 50 percent held positive images of the ETA[146]. Clark comments that, '…the image of ETA held by rank-and-file citizens is quite susceptible to public perception of current events and thus is quite volatile.'[147] Consequently, ETA's integration of Basque communities can quickly confuse ETA's message and directly influence access to sanctuaries.

Sanctuaries reduce the operational need for resources, provide rest and recuperation zones, and safe havens for training. The ETA maintains sanctuaries in Southern France and within the network of villages in Basque country. Southern France provided a huge logistical and operational advantage for the ETA dictated by relations between the ETA, French and Spanish governments. In contrast, the dynamics of local sanctuaries in the Basque country correlated directly to ETA's integration into the local community[148].

Clark states that ETA had '… embedded itself organisationally in the everyday life of the Basque village.'[149] The concentration of ETA representation in smaller communities increased the level of social control among the intimate social and cultural networks enabling higher levels of sectarian thinking[150]. In this sense, local Basques understood the *etarra* sacrifice but targeting miscalculations still widened the gap between moderate and radical Basques during the 1980s[151]. For example, the targeting of Basque Nationalist party (PNV) members for revolutionary taxes confused and polarized the Basque community[152]. However, Clark comments that within the village environment almost everyone knows who the *etarras* are, except the security

---

[145] Clark, p. 173.
[146] Clark, p. 177.
[147] Clark, p. 176.
[148] Irvin, p. 39.
[149] Clark, p. 161.
[150] Mees, p. 821.
[151] Mees, p. 810.
[152] Sullivan, p. 244.

services[153]. In this sense, there is a protective shield surrounding the ETA within the village environment[154]. Subsequently, ETA's high degree of integration into Basque social networks according to Clark produced sympathetic households in nearly every village in both Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa[155].

Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for popular support:

1. The interaction between ETA's *comandos* and the Basque community, underpinned by village traditions increases ETA's social integration, which increases sympathy to ETA's cause
2. Selective high and low profile targeting resulted in security force overreaction contributing to the maintenance of popular support
3. Symbolic targeting contributed to polarising elements of the Basque community in opposition to ETA's armed struggle (-)
4. A majority of ETA's supporters tended to remain uncommitted towards the ETA's armed struggle but still approved of its aims
5. Repressive counter-terrorism measures increased support for ETA's aims but not necessarily its methods

In summary, ETA's popular support comprises intimate Basque social networks within Basque villages and towns. Penetration of social networks ensured a somewhat effective integration of community and *etarra*, and in most cases enhanced the understanding of tactical acts and errors. The depth of ETA's integration is representative of available sanctuaries in the Basque communities of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa. While overall ETA support remained stagnant counteracting its strategy of escalation, *comandos* retained an adequate supporter base to operate covertly. Overall, popular support positively influences cell effectiveness to a moderate degree.

---

[153] Clark, R., 'Patterns in the Lives of ETA Members', *Terrorism: An International Journal*, 6:3 (1983), pp. 423-454, p. 454.
[154] Vercher, p. 226.
[155] Clark, p. 229.

Recruitment and the Cuadrilla

This section examines ETA's recruitment process, particularly its situational and character filtering mechanism (see Figure 18). In addition, ETA's attrition rate will be analysed to gain some sense of filtering with regards recruitment rate.

The situational filtering and character identification mechanism identifies recruits with common experiences. The following three main situational and character markers are associated with *etarras*: ethnicity, prior activism and prior experience of repression.

Clark's analysis of political prisoners between 1978 and 1980 shows that most *etarras* were employed or students, working to lower middle-class with one or two Basque parents and came from predominantly Basque towns of 2,000 – 50,000 people[156]. For example, Clark comments the relatively isolated Goierri region of Guipuzcoa with its high ethnic Basque content is fertile recruiting ground for ETA[157]. Having one or two Basque parents heightened or radicalised nationalistic tendencies. For example, Irvin comments that 100 percent of HB activists who espoused nationalist goals had nationalist family backgrounds[158]. Moreover, bilingual Basque country schools instilled strong nationalist pride, which according to Trevino acted more as '…"centres of subversion" than of learning.'[159] Subsequently, the intimate and relatively isolated Basque villages and towns maintained well-established social networks with strong bonds of loyalty[160]. Clark comments:

> For young Basque men have already spent as much as a decade in which the dominant social factor was a small group of intimate friends bound in tight cohesion against strangers from the outside [*cuadrilla*]. In this important respect (as in others), the culture of small Basque towns is ideal for the implantation of a clandestine political organisation formed around the secret cell concept. [161]

---

[156] Clark, p. 146-150.
[157] Clark, p. 198.
[158] Irvin, p. 155.
[159] Trevino, p. 153.
[160] Mees, p. 105.
[161] Clark, Patterns in the Lives of ETA Members, p. 449.

The tradition of the *cuadrilla* flourished in this environment along with nationalism, which when combined with ETA precursor organisations provided a reservoir of future *etarras*.

Irvin's study of HB activists shows a broad range of prior political experiences. This includes an involvement in protests in support of prisoner amnesties, trade unions, precursor organisations to HB and/or participation in antinuclear campaigns[162]. For example, a precursor to joining the ETA in the early 1970s was through the *Herri Gaztedi* youth organisation, which according to Zulaika '…offered a platform to raise political consciousness. The beneficiary was ETA.'[163] Moreover, Clark comments that '…potential etarras resist for months or even years before yielding the call to join.' [164] In this sense, prior activism combined with state suppression played a key role in deciding to join the ETA[165].

Irvin shows that one in five HB activists interviewed had been detained and approximately half of all activists had experienced state repression, including physical or verbal harassment and/or a relative or friend arrested, imprisoned, wounded or killed[166]. Moreover, Irvin comments that in 1985 state violence had afflicted at least sixteen percent of all Basques (238,000)[167]. Trevino states, 'It has been said that ETA's best recruiting aids are the police tactics and the resentment they create among the Basques.'[168] Between 1982 and 1986 the GAL, the repression of political prisoners and the use of torture generated incentives for joining ETA[169].

---

[162] Irvin, p. 145.
[163] Zulaika, p. 61.
[164] Clark, Patterns in the Lives of ETA Members, p. 436.
[165] Clark, Patterns in the Lives of ETA Members, p. 440.
[166] Irvin, p. 142.
[167] Irvin, p. 36.
[168] Trevino, p. 153.
[169] Irvin, p. 193.

The contact phase of joining would usually consist of an ETA member approaching the prospective recruit. However, the Itzair *comando* used the leader of their youth movement to arrange an appointment with the ETA[170]. Following contact, a discouragement phase ensues testing the commitment of the recruits using political conversations and debates, allowing time for background checks[171]. At this early stage, ETA recruits would be limited to contact with their ETA sponsor and only fed information on a need to know basis[172]. Conscience raising, including political discussions, and simple operations, such as delivering pamphlets to a drop point, dominated this phase. Moreover, as the complexity of operations increased the notion of *ekintza* gradually developed[173]. For example, Zulaika describes the Itzair *comandos* first *ekintza* as stealing dynamite together. Subsequently, the solidarity within the trainee cell grew in this fashion[174]. After approximately a one-year recruitment process, the candidates would become full members[175].

In 1981, Clark estimated the size of the ETA at approximately 300 *etarras*[176]. The recruitment mechanism brings into the organisation existing patterns of nationalism and solidarity, and a broad range of technical skills. For example, a *comando* broken up in 1980 comprised a carpenter, construction worker, labourer, industrial machinist and office worker. All were in their late twenty's, two were married and most lived in their hometowns[177]. In addition to matching individuals to the organisation, the ETA also matched the *cuadrilla* to the *comando.*

---

[170] Zulaika, p. 63.
[171] Alexander, Swetnam and Levine, p. 11.
[172] Anderson, p. 46.
[173] ibid.
[174] Zulaika, p. 68.
[175] Anderson, p. 46.
[176] Clark, p. 223.
[177] Clark, p. 210.

Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for recruitment:

1. The use of symbolism, ideology and tradition build the *etarras* revolutionary conscience and increase their commitment
2. ETA's social integration into Basque villages and towns provides reservoirs for recruitment
3. Counter intelligence screens recruits to detect infiltration
4. Attack effectiveness both produces and attracts new recruits
5. The effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures increases the perceived threat to the recruit's survivability lowering the recruitment rate (-)

In summary, the effectiveness of ETA's recruitment process derives from ETA's capacity to sustain its attrition rate. This requires measuring the replacement rate of *etarras* exiting the organisation, which is somewhat problematic[178]. According to Spanish Ministry of Interior Figures, between 1980 and 1984 interred *etarras* averaged 543 per annum[179]. The average attrition rate of *etarra* captures was 24 *etarras* per annum, however between 1983 and 1984 the number of detainees increased by 184 or 47 percent[180]. Bearing in mind the high average prisoner population, the long process of recruitment and the sudden increase in prisoners in 1984 one could argue the attrition rate would have been hard-pressed to maintain ETA's 300 membership. While the filtering process of recruitment was very effective in shaping recruits, the process took too long and failed to adapt to the intensive counter-terrorism environment. With fewer members, services degrade, popular support suffers and *comandos* become stretched to maintain effectiveness. Consequently, recruitment negatively influenced cell effectiveness to a low degree.

---

[178] Official Figures relating to *etarras* killed have not been found (language barrier may be an issue), nor have those retiring from the organisation. Moreover, to determine whether ETA prisoners are all full members of the ETA remains problematic.

[179] Spanish Civil Guard Statistics – Detained ETA Member Statistics retrieved 1 August 2003, from http://www.guardiacivil.org/terrorismo/estadisticas5.asp

[180] Spanish Civil Guard Statistics – Dismantled *Comandos* Statistics retrieved 1 August 2003, from http://www.guardiacivil.org/terrorismo/estadisticas3.asp

Training and Southern France

This section will examine ETA's formal and ongoing informal training processes (see Figure 18). This analysis will show that training reflects operational survivability, which contributes to cell effectiveness.

The new *etarra* attended a formal two-week training course in Southern France[181]. Southern France acted as ETA's primary training location, although *etarras* sometimes attended overseas camps for training in an effort to learn new skills and ideas for assimilation into the organisation[182]. For example, ETA apparently learned the system of revolutionary taxes from the Irish Republican Army (IRA)[183].

ETA's training course would teach various weapons skills and present lectures on subjects such as interrogation, kidnapping, assassination techniques and presumably communications security[184]. The latter derives from the difficulty ETA members had in articulating thoughts during public appearances, an indication of their wariness for 'easy talk'[185]. The complexity of ETA operations gives some sense of the standard of training received. For example, the favourite weapons of *etarras* were explosive devices and automatic weapons[186], whereas the least favourite appears to have been pistols[187]. Automatic weapons and bombings both made up for the lack of marksmanship required of pistols[188]. Upon the completion of training, *etarras* would return to village life and await further direction[189]. The ritual of *ekintza* appears to have been crucial for ongoing informal training.

---

[181] Clark, p. 223.
[182] Alexander, Swetnam and Levine, p. 23.
[183] Clark, p. 228.
[184] Clark, p. 223 and Woodworth, p. 78.
[185] Zulaika, p. 202.
[186] Clark, p. 129.
[187] ibid.
[188] Clark, p. 130.
[189] Clark, p. 223.

The *ekintza* provides the backdrop for gaining experience[190]. Essentially, as *ekintza* operations gradually increased in seriousness and complexity the *etarra* would learn from both mistakes and successes. For example, the Itzair *comando* described by Zulaika initially started stealing dynamite and progressed to kidnappings and killings[191]. Statistics from the Spanish Ministry of Interior indicate that during 1984 12 *comandos* were broken up[192]. Of the 12, two were *comandos liberado*, the remainder a mix of intelligence and support *comandos*[193]. This imbalance suggests but in no way confirms the effectiveness of the *ekintza* as an informal training process.

Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for training:

1. Links with foreign organisations and countries have contributed operational information to the ETA's knowledgebase
2. Commitment (*ekintza*) is developed during the continued informal training of *etarras*
3. The Southern France sanctuary is crucial for training
4. An abundant supply of various kinds of weaponry reduces the need for skilled weapons operators

In summary, training incrementally produces higher initiation and exit costs. The perpetuating process of irrevocable acts increases ones dependency on the organisation further isolating the volunteer from the community. Consequently, the training component positively influenced cell effectiveness to a high degree.

---

[190] This is somewhat speculative, however Clark does mention ongoing indoctrination and Zulaika's description of *ekintza* can be interpreted as a framework that encourages improvement. Moreover, Mao Tse Tung advocated using guerrilla hostilities as the university of war and in this sense the *ekintza* could equate to on-the-job training.
Source: Asprey, R., *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History*, vol. 1, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1975, p. 361.
[191] Zulaika, p. 68.
[192] Spanish Civil Guard Statistics – Dismantled *Comandos* Statistics, Internet.
[193] ibid.

Ethnicity

Secondary
Movements

1. Compartmentalization

High Profile
Targeting

Popular
Support

5. Counter-Terrorism
Measures

2. Selective
Targeting

Low Profile
Targeting

3. Symbolic Targeting

4. Commitment

Formal
Training

Informal
Training

1. Foreign
Relationships

Sanctuary

2. Ekintza

Training

4. Logistics

3. Sanctuary

Situational
Filtering and
Markers

3. Counter
Intelligence

1. Commitment

4. Attack
Effectiveness

2. Popular Support

Recruitment

5. Counter-Terrorism
Measures

Number of etarras

Cell
Effectiveness

Legend:
Contributory Parts: Top Lines
Feedback Influences: Side Lines
Output Parts: Bottom Lines
White: Compartmentalization
Sky Blue: Leadership
Green: Commitment
Gold: Organisational Formation
Plum: Operational Patterns
Grey: Counter-Terrorism Measures

Figure 18: ETA Systems Decomposition of Organisational Formation

Logistics and Escalation

This section examines the extent of supply sources in ETA's logistics apparatus (see Figure 19). This analysis will show that these supply sources ultimately determine the utility of the strategy and capacity of the cell to remain effective long-term.

The ETA is a low cost organisation, which is essentially indicative of its cellular infrastructure the size of which Clark estimates at approximately 300 *etarras*[194]. The major running costs for ETA appears to have been expenses for *liberados* and costs associated with its logistics infrastructure. However, determining the costs associated to full-time members is problematic.

Clark's 1978 – 1980 study of arrest records and case studies of 81 *etarras* identified 95 percent as being students or employed[195]. Recruiting practices tended to favour employed Basques. For example, Irvin's study of HB activists showed that 21 percent were unemployed before joining HB, which mirrored the existing Basque unemployment rate[196]. A similar mirroring of Basque society arguably applies to the ETA. A mixture of employed and unemployed *etarras* suggests that being a *liberado* did not necessarily mean being full-time, which is further supported by Clark's estimate that *comandos* only attacked once in every eight months[197]. Therefore, it can be argued while *liberados* made up approximately 50 percent of ETA, not all were full-time and in this context, the relative expense of full-time *liberados* would likely have been low.

The ETA utilised local and European sources for both fund raising and weaponry purchases. Local sources provided hard cash and weaponry. The ETA's principle means for raising cash and weaponry was through robberies and theft, kidnappings and revolutionary taxes.

---

[194] Clark, p. 223.
[195] Clark, p. 146-150.
[196] Irvin, p. 135.
[197] Clark, Patterns in the Lives of ETA Members, p. 446.

Criminal acts were ETA's predominant method of financing. During 1978, 50 bank robberies netted U.S four million dollars[198]. Kidnappings were also successful, netting in 1978 at least a quarter of a million U.S dollars[199]. Its one off capacity to raise large sums can be appreciated from a 1981 kidnapping in Madrid, which netted US $3.29 million dollars[200]. However, levying revolutionary taxes[201] on Basque businessmen, ranging from industrialists to shopkeepers operated with long-term success[202]. By the end of 1978, the ETA had levied the revolutionary tax on approximately 800 wealthy Basques of which most paid[203]. Failure to pay revolutionary taxes usually resulted in ETA attacks. For example, between 1978 and 1980, ETA targeted at least nine businessmen[204]. In contrast to local funding, the European continent acted as ETA's principle source of weaponry.

Both European black-market sources and theft from outside Spain were used extensively to acquire a multitude of rifles, pistols and explosives. This included the 9mm Uzi, Sten Mark II, M-16, Belgian FAL and Browning 9mm pistol as well as GOMA-2[205] commercial explosives[206]. Both Paris and Brussels were the focal points for many transactions[207]. According to Clark, the *comandos* were equipped with approximately 3.5 weapons per *comando*[208]. For example, a five-man *comando* broken up in 1980 had one Sten gun, four 9mm pistols, two revolvers, ammo, grenades, explosives and detonators[209]. Once weapons arrived in Spanish Basque country,

---

[198] Clark, p. 227.
[199] Clark, p. 227.
[200] Alexander, p. 34.
[201] A process of identifying targets for extortion was meticulously carried out followed by sending out a primary letter demanding payment of from US $12,000 – US $25,000 per annum. A second letter would follow if payment was not received and subsequently if that was ignored, property could be destroyed or threats to the target or targets family carried out.
Source: Clark, p. 228.
[202] Woodworth, p. 105.
[203] Clark, p. 228.
[204] ibid.
[205] Trevino, p. 153.
[206] Clark, p. 225.
[207] Clark, p. 224.
[208] ibid.
[209] Clark, p. 210.

they disappeared amongst the extensive network of supporters and safe house's[210].

Trevino states, 'Failures by the police to locate the large caches may be due to ETA's extremely tight internal security and the use of well concealed safe houses, possibly in Southern France.'[211] The sanctuary in Southern France provided an extensive area to hide weapons caches. For example, a Spanish intelligence operation uncovered weaponry among other items in a French based furniture store[212]. The Southern France sanctuary and ETA's extensive courier and supporter network without a doubt shielded the organisation from the Spanish interdiction of supply chains.

Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for logistics:

1. A reliance on high risk primary financial sources and a lack of extensive secondary supply sources arguably slowed organisational regeneration (-)
2. Symbolic targeting of Basque businessmen encouraged the payment of revolutionary taxes
3. Sanctuaries shielded supply chains from interdiction
4. The organisation's cellular system kept running costs to a minimum
5. Counter-Terrorism measures were ineffective at interdicting supply chains

In summary, a reliance on high-risk primary financial sources and a lack of secondary financial sources likely acted against the regenerative capacity of the ETA in the context of its escalation strategy. In this sense, the ETA could do little more than tread water. However, these logistical weaknesses did not have a significant impact on the *comandos* who remained adequately supplied and were somewhat financially independent. Overall, logistics positively influenced the attack component to a moderate degree.

---

[210] Clark, p. 229.
[211] Trevino, p. 153.
[212] Brotons and Esposito, 168.

Intelligence and Specialised Cells

This section examines ETA's counter-intelligence capability and capacity to produce well-developed operational intelligence (see Figure 19). This analysis will examine intelligence as an integral component in implementing ETA's 'action-repression-action' strategy and maintaining the long-term effectiveness of the cell.

Even though ETA's counter-intelligence capacity remains relatively undocumented[213], counter-intelligence activities appear focused on eliminating informers. For example, Clark shows that between 1975 and 1980 out of the 287 persons killed by the ETA approximately 16 were alleged informers[214]. Moreover, both Zirakzadeh[215] and Vercher[216] comment on the ruthlessness and infiltration of the ETA intelligence network throughout all levels of Basque society and the ensuing difficulty security forces had in recruiting informers. For example, Zulaika describes ex-ETA members being involved in '…intimidating and castigating alleged police informers…'[217] In each of these cases the pervasiveness of the ETA in Basque society is omnipresent[218]. In contrast, ETA's specialised intelligence *comandos* gathered operational intelligence in support of the *comandos liberado*[219].

The intelligence *comandos* primary task was to gather targeting data. This might involve monitoring a target for several weeks gathering photos, collecting blueprints and personal information, such as routines. These techniques apply particularly to the assassination of Prime Minister Carrero Blanco on 20

---

[213] The apparent lack of data concerning ETA's counter-intelligence capacity may be due to the language barrier. However, this is a weak area for all organisations in this study, which suggests it is not well studied.
[214] Clark, p. 137.
[215] Zirakzadeh, p. 134.
[216] Vercher, p. 308.
[217] Zulaika, p. 85.
[218] The lack of any counter-intelligence apparatus suggests sympathisers, intelligence cells and *comandos liberado* most likely identified informers.
[219] Clark, p. 232.

December 1974, whose routine was monitored for several months before the intelligence *comando* discovered a consistent and reliable pattern of behaviour[220]. Moreover, Clark comments on a captured intelligence *comando* which had monitored the routine of a former mayor, gathered information on airports, several electric power plant installations and on two national policemen[221]. This voracious gathering of targeting information is systematic of using specialised intelligence *comandos*.

Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for intelligence:

1. Integration into Basque society contributed to ETA's intelligence gathering capability

In summary, the ETA's counter-intelligence network appears to have been effective in detecting and dealing with informers. In contrast, the use of specialised intelligence *comandos* ensured a high level of proficiency in the development of operational intelligence. Their specialised experience in the detection of vulnerabilities and identification of best method approach, attack and escape phases would have contributed significantly to the attack effectiveness of *comandos liberados*. Overall, intelligence positively influenced the attack component to a high degree.

---

[220] Anderson, p. 26.
[221] Clark, Patterns in the Lives of ETA Members, p. 444.

Attacks and Surgical Strikes

This section will primarily examine the doctrine of ETA to give some sense of attack effectiveness (see Figure 19). This analysis will identify the tactical variety employed by the ETA *comando*, which is a crucial determinant in mitigating risk and sustaining cell effectiveness.

ETA's 'action-repression-action' strategy maintains the following two key themes: to cause overreaction through selective targeting and escalation through increasingly provocative acts. In order to meet these objectives the following three common attack patterns provide a sense of ETA's doctrine[222]:

- Hit and run tactics
- The manipulation of stand-off range
- Firepower superiority

Hit and run tactics consists of approach, attack and escape phases utilising caution and surprise to ensure a rapid engagement and exit. This precept applies for close-in assassinations or ambushes of *Guardia Civil* officers and higher echelons of military personnel. For example, Clark shows that between 1975 and 1980 pistols and automatic weapons accounted for 30 percent of all ETA victims[223]. For the same period, 68 percent of those killed were law enforcement or military personnel[224]. During the approach phase the need for caution while paramount was somewhat negated by the ETA's level of integration into Basque society.

Time, place and kind of target determined hit and run tactics, which ranged from assassinations to simple ambushes. Targets included individual or groups of *Guardia Civil* officers. For example, between 1975 and 1980, 50 percent of those killed were individuals followed by 38 percent comprising groups of two to five people[225]. At least half of all attacks tended to focus on times and places when the target was in transit or

---

[222] These common attack patterns are based on attacks using examples from the literature reviewed.
[223] Clark, p. 129.
[224] Clark, p. 135.
[225] Clark, p. 131.

on breaks in public or urban areas[226]. The attack phase emphasised surgical precision using either pistols or automatic weapons. Vercher summarises the assassination process as follows:

Most killings occur in broad daylight in the streets. On other occasions the terrorists calmly walk into a bar or cafeteria serving policemen on break from their duties. Often without even bothering to conceal their identities, the terrorists single out their targets and 'execute' them in front of scores of onlookers, yet, when police investigations try to ascertain the facts, witnesses are almost impossible to find.[227]

Consequently, the need for caution while heightened appears somewhat reduced by the vulnerability and public location of the target(s).

The escape phase made use of ETA's extensive supporter network within the Basque villages and towns. However, the extent of this network is dependent on the surrounding social conditions at the time[228]. For example, following the kidnapping of a local well-known Basque industrialist by the Itzair *comando* and his subsequent execution ordered by ETA leadership, outrage among the Basque community forced the *comando* to either go completely underground or into exile[229]. In contrast, the manipulation of standoff range can somewhat mitigate this risk.

The manipulation of standoff range determines the engagement range, which correlates to the degree of threat and resources allocated to the operation. ETA kidnappings and bombings present opposite extremes of the engagement range spectrum. Approximately 10 percent of all ETA attacks between 1975 and 1980 were kidnappings[230]. Overall,

---

[226] Woodworth, p. 63 and Clark, p. 130.
[227] Vercher, p. 226.
[228] Zirakzadeh, p. 137.
[229] Zulaika, p. 88.
[230] ETA (pm) is credited with 60 percent of total kidnappings (24) between 1975 and 1980.
Source: Clark, p. 128.

ETA kidnapped 77 people between 1972 and 1997[231]. Kidnappings contain inherent risk and resource issues including political fallout and threats to the hostage takers, which both increase over time[232]. However, ETA's systematic use of kidnapping since 1970 has somewhat negated these disadvantages. In contrast, bombings correlate directly to threat and resource reduction.

Between 1975 and 1980, ETA bombings accounted for 45 percent of all ETA victims[233]. ETA's methods for bombings comprise explosive devices placed in mail, transportation, public places and infrastructure. For example, between 1977 and 1982, the ETA employed 269 bombings against the Lemoniz nuclear power plant[234]. Car bombings appear to be ETA's preferred means of surgical strike. According to Alexander, Swetnam and Levine between 1968 and 2001 ETA have initiated 141 car bomb attacks[235]. Car bombings have a high-end standoff capability with controllable attack radii amenable to escalating attacks vis-à-vis ambushes. Consequently, as operational standoff range increases the threat to *etarras* and requirements for resources decrease. However, firepower superiority can mitigate the risks of close-in engagement ranges.

Firepower superiority mitigates the security force threat. The selective targeting process, which in 87 percent of cases targeted from one to five persons, reduced the chances *comandos* would be overwhelmed by superior firepower[236]. Combinations of sub-machine guns, rifles and grenades ensured firepower superiority against *guardia civil* and *policia* patrol officers[237]. However, selective targeting and combinations of hit and run tactics also allowed surprise and initiative contributing to mitigating the security force threat.

---

[231] Brotons and Esposito, p. 409, 14n.
[232] Zirakzadeh, 2001, p. 349.
[233] Clark, p. 129.
[234] Alexander, p. 30.
[235] Alexander, Swetnam and Levine, p. 25.
[236] Clark, p. 131.
[237] Alexander, Swetnam and Levine, p. 25.

Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for attacks:

1. A high degree of compartmentalization (secrecy) increased attack effectiveness
2. The safety of the *etarra* is inherent in selective targeting, which increases long-term attack effectiveness
3. The *ekintza* justifies the act as a personal duty or commitment
4. Basque popular support provides supplemental operational support and produces an operational environment less dependant on deception
5. Training provides *etarras* with attack and survivability skills specific to ETA's doctrine increasing attack effectiveness
6. Counter-Terrorism measures disrupted ETA leadership and possibly made some tactics more problematic to execute decreasing attack effectiveness (-)

In summary, the success of an attack qualifies its repeated use as a traditional tactic. ETA's traditional tactics consisted of shooting assassinations, kidnappings and bombings, especially car bombings. Non-traditional tactics while successful require greater resources and/or engender greater risks. These tactics have consisted of coordinated ambushes and assaults on infrastructure. Subsequently, the tactics employed by ETA suggest a high degree of tactical variety. Overall, attack effectiveness positively influenced cell effectiveness to a high degree.

Low Organisational Costs

Weaponry Sources

Financial Sources

1. Action-Repression-Action Strategy

2. Symbolic Targeting

3. Sanctuary

4. Number of Etarras

Logistics

5. Counter-Terrorism Measures

Counter-Intelligence

Operational Intelligence

1. Popular Support

Intelligence

Weapons Variety and Effectiveness

Doctrine

1. Compartmentalization

2. Selective Targeting

3. Commitment

4. Popular Support

5. Training

Attacks

6. Counter-Terrorism Measures

Attack Effectiveness

Cell Effectiveness

Legend:
Contributory Parts: Top Lines
Feedback Influences: Side Lines
Output Parts: Bottom Lines
White: Compartmentalization
Sky Blue: Leadership
Green: Commitment
Gold: Organisational Formation
Plum: Operational Patterns
Grey: Counter-Terrorism Measures

Figure 19: ETA Systems Decomposition of Operational Patterns

49

Counter-Terrorism Measures and Repentant Terrorists

This section will describe the central counter-terrorism measures used by Spain's Security Forces (see Figure 20). This analysis will develop Spain's counter-terrorism framework in order to show the effectiveness of legislative measures and intelligence gathering mechanisms used in disrupting the effectiveness of ETA *comandos*.

The Spanish counter-terrorism strategy, designated plan ZEN (Special Northern Zone), instigated the intensification of the security climate in Basque country[238]. Plan ZEN employed a three-pronged strategy supported by robust counter-terrorism laws isolating and attacking ETA's leadership, members and ideology. The three approaches comprised using state directed terrorism to compromise the French sanctuary, employing mass arrests to dismantle Spanish based *comandos* and introducing divisive techniques of ideological dissuasion using innovative legal measures. Plan ZEN initially toughened up the counter-terrorism laws[239].

Significant counter-terrorism laws included organic law 11/1980 and 9/1984. Law 11/1980 suspended particular constitutional guarantees, such as warrant based searches, and introduced *Habeas Corpus* or the right to be detained *incommunicado* (in-communication) for a total of 10 days[240]. In 1981, a system of amnesty for terrorists introduced the policy of social reinsertion[241]. Subsequently, Organic law 9/1984 completed the legal framework by introducing the accomplice evidence system allowing for leniency in sentencing in exchange for information[242]. Operating within this legal framework was a counter-terrorism organisational structure comprising urban and rural police working along side a specialised counter-terrorism unit.

---

[238] Woodworth, p. 68.
[239] Anderson, p. 37.
[240] *Incommunicado* means cut off from all external sources while incarcerated.
Source: Vercher, p. 229.
[241] Woodworth, p. 64.
[242] Vercher, p. 285.

Under the political direction of the Spanish Minister of the Interior[243], the Spanish police forces were responsible for directing government strategy against the ETA[244]. The security forces comprise four principal services[245] including: the *Guardia Civil*, the *Policia* (National Police), the *Conesca* Group and the Spanish Intelligence service.

The *Guardia Civil* was a well-armed[246] paramilitary civil guard police force that specialised in counter-terrorism in areas with populations fewer than 20,000[247]. They operated special rural counter-terrorism groups, the *Grupo Anti-terrorista Rural* (GAR)[248] and a special intervention group, the *Unidad Especial de Intervencion* (GEI) for crisis prevention, such as kidnapping cases[249]. During the 1970s and 1980s, there were approximately 12,000 *Guardia* in the Basque Provinces[250]. In contrast, the *Policia* patrolled the larger cities[251] and operated under regional headquarters each with its own intelligence division.

The *Conesea* group was formed in 1978 to gather intelligence on terrorist organisations[252]. *Conesea* used police records, surveillance and detainees to generate clues on persons associated to the ETA[253]. Clark comments they were committed to building informer networks[254]. The *Centro Superior de Informacion*

---

[243] Jimenez, p. 125.

[244] Woodworth, p. 12.

[245] The Basque Autonomous police force formed in mid-1982. While an active deterrent it was however primarily symbolic during this early period with an emphasis on service to the ethnic Basque community. Its role contributed to isolating the ETA from its popular support base. Source: Macdonald, I., 'The Police System of Spain' in Roach, J and Thomaneck, J (eds), *Police and Public Order in Europe*, London: Croom Helm, 1985, pp. 215-254., p. 245.

[246] The *Guardia* were well-armed carrying 9mm pistols with units carrying 7.62mm rifles and 9 mm sub-machineguns.
Source: Macdonald, p. 237.

[247] Macdonald, p. 234.

[248] Jimenez, p. 126.

[249] Clark, p. 266.

[250] Clark, p. 263.

[251] Trevino, p. 152.

[252] Clark, p. 265.

[253] Vercher, p. 242.

[254] Press accounts indicate that between September and December 1978 *Conesca* uncovered 46 ETA cells.
Source: Clark, p. 266.

de la Defensa (CESID - Higher Defence Intelligence Centre) was mandated foreign intelligence, counter-espionage and internal defence[255]. In 1986, they were involved in uncovering an ETA nerve centre in France, after selling and then tracking two wired Russian missiles to a furniture store in Hendaya, France[256]. However, the overall extent of CESID activities remains unclear.

Conesea, the *Guardia* and *Policia* generated intelligence through informer networks, grassroots patrolling and interrogations. In 1980, the police presence in the Basque country comprised 17 percent of the entire Spanish security forces[257]. Trevino indicates that the ratio of police per capita was a low 600 to 1[258] and suggests that the police tended to be more reactive when arresting members of the ETA and searching for weapons caches[259]. MacDonald suggests intelligence issues, such as the Basque language and inter-service rivalry hindered terrorist investigations[260]. In this sense, it can be tentatively argued that the security forces were ineffective as a cohesive counter-terrorism force at the national level, however they had some success at dismantling *comandos* at local levels, particularly using an aggressive investigative process.

Detention was part of the investigation process used to gain information and/or a confession. In Spain, the investigation process is a preliminary step carried out by the police and judiciary (a judge) so that a summary of facts can be prepared to commit the suspect to trial[261]. Suspects were detained for up to ten days, however in reality detainees were sometimes held for months or years[262].

Detention was a process combined with interrogation that in addition to gaining confessions inevitably produced intelligence. The aggressiveness of this

---

[255] Macdonald, p. 242.
[256] Brotons and Esposito, p. 168.
[257] Irvin, p. 194.
[258] Trevino, p. 152.
[259] Trevino, p. 143.
[260] Macdonald, p. 249.
[261] Vercher, p. 329.
[262] Vercher, p. 475, 34n.

process is systematic of the uncooperative Basque community[263]. Vercher comments that between 1980 and 1983 of the 1,612 out of 3,604 detainees held for over 72 hours, two thirds were charged with offences relating to the ETA[264]. Moreover, Irvin shows that between 1980 and 1985 there were an average of 1,547 arrests per annum[265] or 128 arrests per month, which peaked in 1984[266]. Vercher comments that the consequence of prolonged detention is torture and in 1986, 25 *Guardia* and *Policia* were convicted of varying degrees of torture[267]. In contrast to the inevitable fallout from interrogations, the system of repentant terrorists was highly divisive and a threat to the ETA. Both social re-insertion and the accomplice evidence system encapsulated this counter-terrorism measure.

Social reinsertion allowed for the reintegration of imprisoned or exiled terrorists based on the renunciation[268] of all terrorist activities[269]. Between 1983 and 1984, 119 former ETA (p-m) members benefited from social reinsertion, as did 107 former ETA (m) terrorists in 1986[270]. According to Vercher, the success of this system was in not attempting to target the strong traditional links embedded in the lives of active terrorists but rather in targeting links weakened through exile or imprisonment[271]. This system threatened ETA's revolutionary conscience, which is evident in executions of former members who accepted social reinsertion and ETA's attempted assassination of the policies author[272]. Woodworth states, 'ETA (m) regarded this policy as a dangerously

---

[263] Vercher, p. 226.
[264] Vercher, p. 229.
[265] It should be noted that Vercher's Figures seem to be lower than Irvin's by approximately 2,000 arrests. From 1980 – 1983 Irvin lists 5,858 arrests whereas Vercher indicates 3,604 detainees. The difference could be to do with definition between what constitutes an arrest and what constitutes a detainee.
[266] Irvin, p. 194.
[267] Vercher, p. 234.
[268] According to the law, renunciation is not a psychological or mental change but rather a voluntary disassociation from political violence.
Source: Vercher, p. 291.
[269] Woodworth, p. 64.
[270] Vercher, p. 297.
[271] Vercher, p. 298.
[272] Interestingly, the author of social reinsertion was the brother of the Minister of Interior.
Source: Woodworth, p. 133.

seductive blueprint for betrayal.'[273] In contrast, the accomplice evidence system, similar in many ways to the British supergrass system, was not as successful.

The accomplice evidence system offered active terrorists, in exchange for information and the renunciation of political violence, lenient sentences or pardons[274]. According to Vercher, this policy appeared less successful then social reinsertion considering only one supergrass case has ever been documented[275]. The imbalance of information given by *etarras* in different hierarchical positions resulted in inconsistencies in the leniency received, which in most cases was slight[276]. However, the security forces did utilise informers[277]. For example, Woodworth quotes the Head of Police Intelligence as stating: 'Interior pays police informers for the surveillance of etarras in the South of France.'[278] The deficiencies of this system correlate to the practicalities of recruiting informers within the Spanish strategy. Basque traditions made this a difficult proposition, hence one could argue informers while valuable did not drive real-time intelligence gathering, which arguably reflects the reactive nature of the police. However, the intelligence developed from informers most likely contributed to larger-scale operations, such as the state directed terrorism campaign in Southern France.

A campaign of state directed terrorism operated in Southern France between 1983 and 1987 killing 27 individuals, most of who were members of the ETA leadership apparatus[279]. The *Grupos Antiterroristas de liberacion* (GAL) organisation comprised foreign mercenaries as part of a covert campaign run by senior members of the Spanish government. According to Woodworth, the GAL's agenda was to put the ETA

---

[273] Woodworth, p. 133.
[274] Vercher, p. 285.
[275] One supposed supergrass was a Ramon Arranza.
Source: Vercher, p. 499, 66n.
[276] Vercher, p. 292.
[277] According to Vercher, the government were paying informers the equivalent of 75 to 100 pounds per week.
Source: Vercher, p. 504, 129n.
[278] Woodworth, p. 162.
[279] Woodworth, 'Why Do They Kill? The Basque Conflict in Spain', p. 7.

leadership under siege and encourage France to act against the ETA[280]. Targeting included senior leaders, members and associates of the ETA. For example, Santiago Brouard the president of HASI (Popular Revolutionary Socialist Party) and spokesman for ETA was assassinated on 20 November 1984 and subsequently martyred[281]. Woodworth states, 'In the 1980s ETA would get no better recruiting sergeant than the GAL.'[282]

Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for counter-terrorism measures:

1. Territorial and operational compartmentalization localised the information extracted during interrogations reducing counter-terrorism measures (-)
2. ETA's strategy resulted in Spain's multi-pronged overreaction which exceeded its capacity to regenerate
3. Leadership centralisation in Southern France made it vulnerable to targeting
4. Selective targeting of security forces engenders both revenge and urgency within the security forces
5. The strong bonds of the *ekintza* reduced the capability of counter-terrorism measures to disrupt active *etarra* links with one another (-)
6. ETA's degree of integration into Basque villages and towns reduced the effectiveness of security force infiltration (-)
7. ETA's one-year recruitment process deterred potential infiltrators (-)
8. Fewer operatives decrease the effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures (-)
9. The location and composition of ETA's supply chains makes interdiction problematic (-)
10. Counter-intelligence mitigates the effectiveness of informers (-)
11. Highly developed intelligence and tactical variety mitigate attack risk (-)

In summary, Plan ZEN utilised a broad strategy, which implemented forceful counter-terrorism measures to break *etarra* links with one another, the leadership and ideology. While state directed terrorism and interrogation somewhat reinforced *etarra* links the effectiveness of the counter-terrorism measures in concert appears to have suppressed cell effectiveness in various capacities. Subsequently, cell effectiveness while partly degraded by the direct interdiction of ETA operations is also

---

[280] Woodworth, p. 82.
[281] Woodworth, p. 130.
[282] Woodworth, p. 91.

degraded through the disruption of *etarra* links. Overall, counter-terrorism measures have a negative influence on cell effectiveness to a high degree.


Figure 20: ETA Systems Decomposition of Counter-Terrorism Measures

Lifecycle of an Etarra

The lifecycle of an *etarra* (see Figure 21) identifies the various interactions of components of cell capital and resulting feedback loops. The most significant feedbacks occur during recruitment and following attacks. During recruitment, the commitment of the recruit is tested using situational and character filtering, and a series of *ekintza's* and conscience raising exercises. Recruitment filtering correlates to growth modification filtering out those least committed to the life of an *etarra*. Following formal training, attacks and informal training form a primary feedback loop. Each attack sustains collective challenge and collective action. Following each attack, the operative's interaction with informal training reinforces both common interest and purpose. Counter-Terrorism measures provide the dominant means of exit.

Figure 21: Lifecycle of an Etarra

Summary

This report has shown that ETA's cellular components maintained a moderate degree of overall cell effectiveness. These results depict a multi-targeted security strategy in which the formation and operation of ETA *comandos* required high degrees of compartmentalization formulated on Basque traditions to offset ideological threats. The functionality of compartmentalization was facilitated by the cells reliance on Basque traditions for recruitment and commitment, high degrees of village integration to engender popular support, decentralization of control to manage cells and surgical strikes. However, the mismanagement of the recruitment process and logistical weaknesses undermined ETA's overall strategy, which to some degree degraded cell effectiveness.

Selected Bibliography

Articles

Almog, J and Levinson, J., 'Forensic Science Plays a Key Role in the Fight Against Terrorism', *The Police Chief*, 67:October (2000), pp. 131-136.

Butler, L., 'Suicide Bombers Dignity, Despair, and the Need for Hope: An Interview with Eyad El Sarraj, *Journal of Palestinian Studies*, 31:4 (2001), pp. 71-76.

Clark, R., 'Patterns in the Lives of ETA Members', *Terrorism: An International Journal*, 6:3 (1983), pp. 423-454.

Crenshaw, M., 'An Organizational Approach to Political Terrorism', *Orbis*, 29:3 (1985), pp. 465-489.

Dingley, J and Kirk-Smith, M., 'Symbolism and Sacrifice in Terrorism', *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 13:1 (2002), pp 102-128.

Dolnik, A and Bhattacharjee, A., 'Hamas: Suicide Bombings, Rockets, or WMD?', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 14:3 (2002), pp 109-128.

Douglas, W and Zulaika, J., 'On the Interpretation of Terrorist Violence: ETA and the Basque Political Process', *Society for Comparative Study of Society and History*, 33:2 (1990), pp. 238-257.

Eaton, J., 'The Beauty of Asymmetry: An Examination of the Context and Practice of Asymmetric and Unconventional Warfare from a Western/Centrist Perspective', *Defence Studies*, 2:1 (2002), pp. 51-82.

Eshel, D., 'Hamas Resists Pressure as Israel Targets Arafat', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 14:1 (2002), pp 12-15.

Horgan, J and Taylor, M., 'The Making of a Terrorist', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 13:12 (2001), pp.16-18.

Jackson, B., 'Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups: Threat Assessment Informed by Lessons from Private Sector Technology Adoption', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 24:3 (2001), pp. 183-213.

Khatami, S., 'Between Class and Nation: Ideology and Radical Basque Ethnonationalism', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 20:4 (1997), pp. 395-417.

Kristianasen, W., 'Challenge and Counterchallenge: Hamas's Response to Oslo', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 28:3 (1999), pp. 19-36.

Kushner, H., 'Suicide Bombers: Business as Usual', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 19:4 (1996), pp. 329-337.

Luft, Gal., 'The Palestinian H-Bomb', *Foreign Affairs*, 81:4 (2002), pp. 2-8.

Mees, L., 'Between Votes and Bullets: Conflicting Ethnic Identities in the Basque Country', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 24:5 (2001), pp. 798-827.

Moghadam, A., 'Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 26:2 (2003), pp. 65-92.

Rapoport, D., 'Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions', *The American Political Science Review*, 78 (1984), pp. 658-677.

Schbley, A., 'Defining Religious Terrorism: A Causal and Anthological Profile', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 26:2 (2003), pp. 105-134

Shikaki, K., 'Peace Now or Hamas Later', *Foreign Affairs*, 77:4 (1998), pp. 29-43.

Strindberg, A., 'Intifada Revives Rejectionist Factions', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 14:7 (2002), pp 24-26.

Usher, G., 'The Politics of Internal Security: The PA's New Intelligence Services', *Journal of Palestinian Studies*, 25:2 (1996), pp. 21-34.

Woodworth, P., 'Why Do They Kill? The Basque Conflict in Spain', *World Policy Journal*, Spring (2001), pp. 1-12.

Zanini, M., 'Middle Eastern Terrorism and Netwar', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 22:3 (1999), pp. 247-257.

Zulaika, J., 'Terror Totem, and Taboo: Reporting on a Report', *Terrorism Research and Public Policy*, 3:1 (1991), pp. 34-49.

Electronic Sources

Amnesty International USA, 'Israel and the Occupied Territories',
(1999) retrieved 3 May 2003, from
http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/Israel_and_occupied_territories/document.do?id=22C55s99DEBDDC5F802568E400729F04

'An Eavesdroppers Paradise', *Jane's Foreign Report*, March (2002)
retrieved 1 May 2003, from
http://frp.janes.com//docs/frp/search.jsp

'An Odd Assignment', *Jane's Foreign Report*, January (2001)
retrieved 1 May 2003,from
http://frp.janes.com//docs/frp/search.jsp

Blanche, E., 'Israel Uses Intifada Informers to Abet Assassination Campaigns',
Jane's Intelligence Review, December (2001) retrieved 1 May 2003,
from
http://jir.janes.com//docs/frp/search.jsp

Davis, P and Jenkins, B., *Deterrence & Influence in Counterterrorism: A
Component of the War on al Qaeda*, Rand Corporation, (2002)
retrieved 1 February 2003, from
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1619/

Dickey, C, Ephron, D, Barry, J, Hosenball, M and Isikoff, M., 'Inside Suicide
Inc.', *Newsweek*, April (2002) retrieved 2 May 2003, from
http://library.massey.ac.nz/findit/databases/databasesaz.htm (Military and
Government Collection)

Eshel, D., 'Arafat's Evolving Security Forces', *Jane's Intelligence Review*,
January (2001) retrieved 1 May 2003, from
http://jir.janes.com//docs/frp/search.jsp

Eshel, D., 'The rise and fall of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade', *Jane's Intelligence
Review,* June (2002) retrieved 1 May 2003, from
http://jir.janes.com//docs/frp/search.jsp

Eshel, D., 'The Battle for Jenin', J*ane's Intelligence Review,* July (2002)
retrieved 1 May 2003, from
http://jir.janes.com//docs/frp/search.jsp

Eshel, D., 'Israel Refines its Pre-emptive Approach to Counterterrorism',
    Jane's Intelligence Review, September (2002) retrieved 1 May 2003,
    from
    http://jir.janes.com//docs/frp/search.jsp

Eshel, D., 'Israel Hones Intelligence Operations to Counter Intifada',
    Jane's Intelligence Review, October (2002) retrieved 1 May 2003, from
    http://jir.janes.com//docs/frp/search.jsp

Federal Emergency Management Authority, 'Anti-terrorism', (2003) retrieved
    12 September 2003, from
    http://www.fema.gov/fima/antiterrorism/

Gambill, G., 'Sponsoring Terrorism: Syria and Hamas', *Middle East
    Intelligence Bulletin*, 4:10 (2002) retrieved 1 May 2003, from
    http://www.meib.org/articles/0210_s1.htm

'Hamas Divided Against Self', *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin*, 1:6 (1999)
    retrieved 1 May 2003, from
    http://www.meib.org/articles/9906_me2.htm

International Centre for Terrorism (ICT) Database retrieved
    1 September 2003, from
    http://www.ict.org.il/casualties_project/incidentsearch.cfm

Israeli Defence Force (IDF) Incident Reports retrieved
    2 September 2003, from
    http://www.idf.il/newsite/english/dailyevents.stm

Israeli Defence Force (IDF) Incident Reports, 'I.D.F Forces Uncover 2 Tunnels
    Used for Weapons Smuggling' retrieved
    2 September 2003, from
    http://www.idf.il/newsite/english/036.stm

Israeli Defence Force (IDF) Incident Reports, 'Security Forces Capture Terrorist
    Cell Involved in Massive Terrorist Attacks in Jerusalem' retrieved
    2 September 2003, from
    http://www.idf.il/newsite/english/pigua1.stm

Israeli Defence Force (IDF) Official Statistics retrieved
    2 September 2003, from
    http://www.idf.il/english/news/jump_2_eng_300900.stm

'Israel's Hit List', *Jane's Foreign Report*, September (2001) retrieved 1 May 2003, from
http://frp.janes.com//docs/frp/search.jsp

'Israel Turns to the Gaza Strip', *Jane's Foreign Report*, October (2002) retrieved 1 May 2003, from
http://frp.janes.com//docs/frp/search.jsp

'Jordan Strikes at Hamas', *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin*, 1:9 (1999) retrieved 1 May 2003, from
http://www.meib.org/articles/9909_me2.htm

Mata, J., 'A Long History at the Limits of legality Batasuna: The Strategy of Insurrection', *El Pais*, 18 August (2002) retrieved October 2002, from the archives of El Pais Digital www.elpais.es, translated by Brian Hamly on 1 May 2003

Najib, M., 'Israel takes over West Bank Security', *Jane's Intelligence Review,* July (2002) retrieved 1 May 2003, from
http://jir.janes.com//docs/frp/search.jsp

'Nobody Loves an Informer', *Jane's Foreign Report*, May (1996) retrieved 1 May 2003, from
http://frp.janes.com//docs/frp/search.jsp

'Northern Ireland Demographics' retrieved 10 August 2003, from
http://www.geocities.com/pdni/demog.html

O'Brien, K and Lev, I., 'Information Operations and Counterterrorism', *Jane's Intelligence Review,* September (2002) retrieved 1 May 2003, from
http://jir.janes.com//docs/frp/search.jsp

'Palestinian' retrieved 10 June 2003, from
http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palestinian

Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics – Arrests, Imprisonment and Torture Statistics retrieved 1 August 2003, from
http://www.pchrgaza.org/Intifada/Arrests_torture_stat.htm

Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics – Closures, Unemployment and Poverty Statistics, 28 June (2002) retrieved 1 August 2003, from
http://www.pchrgaza.org/Intifada/Closures_stat.htm

Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics - Demolitions Statistics, 28 June (2002)
retrieved 1 August 2003, from
http://www.pchrgaza.org/Intifada/Demolition_stat.htm

Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics - General Statistics, 28 June (2002)
retrieved 1 August 2003, from
http://www.pchrgaza.org/Intifada/General_stat.htm

Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics – Killing and Injury Statistics, 28 June
(2002) retrieved 1 August 2003, from
http://www.pchrgaza.org/Intifada/Killings_stat.htm

Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics - Settlement Statistics, 28 June (2002)
retrieved 1 August 2003, from
http://www.pchrgaza.org/Intifada/Setlements_stat.htm

'Personality Theories' retrieved 10 May 2003, from
http://www.henley-cov.ac.uk/public/xfiles/general/progarea/Humanities/
psychology/webct/gcse/crsnotes/Personality_theories.doc

Radlauer, D., 'The al-Aqsa Intifada – An Engineered Tragedy' retrieved 1
August 2003, from
http://www.ict.org.il//articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=440

Roule, T., 'Post-911 Financial Freeze Dries up Hamas Funding', *Jane's
Intelligence Review,* May (2002) retrieved 1 May 2003, from
http://jir.janes.com//docs/frp/search.jsp

Sobelman, D., 'Divorcing Political and Military Structures', *Jane's Intelligence
Review*, January (2002) retrieved 1 May 2003, from
http://jir.janes.com//docs/frp/search.jsp

Spanish Civil Guard Statistics – Detained ETA Member Statistics retrieved 1
August 2003, from
http://www.guardiacivil.org/terrorismo/estadisticas5.asp

Spanish Civil Guard Statistics – Dismantled *Comandos* Statistics retrieved 1
August 2003, from
http://www.guardiacivil.org/terrorismo/estadisticas3.asp

Spanish Civil Guard Statistics – ETA Assassination Statistics retrieved 1 August   2003,
from
http://www.guardiacivil.org/terrorismo/estadisticas6.asp

Spanish Civil Guard Statistics – Terrorist Action Statistics retrieved 1 August
        2003, from
        http://www.guardiacivil.org/terrorismo/estadisticas2.asp

State of Israel Ministry of Justice, 'The Legal Framework for the Use of
        Administrative Detention as a Means of Combating Terrorism' retrieved
        2 August 2003, from
        http://www.dci-pal.org/publications/a01/section2.pdf

'The Mistakes in Gaza', *Jane's Foreign Report*, May (1995) retrieved 1 May 2003,
        from
        http://frp.janes.com//docs/frp/search.jsp

United States Department of State, 'Legal Designation of Terrorist Groups'
        retrieved 5 September 2003, from
        http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2003/12389.htm

Books

Adams, J, Morgan, R and Bambridge, A., *Ambush: The War Between the SAS
        and the IRA*, London: Pan Books, 1988.

Alexander, Y (ed.), *Combating Terrorism*, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of
        Michigan Press, 2002.

Alexander, Y., *Palestinian Religious Terrorism: Hamas and Islamic Jihad*,
        Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc, 2002.

Alexander, Y and Myers, K (eds), *Terrorism in Europe*, London: Croom Helm, 1982.

Alexander, Y., Swetnam, M. and Levine, H., *ETA: Profile of a Terrorist Group*,
        New York: Transnational Publishers, 2001.

Anderson, W., *The ETA: Spains Basque Terrorists*, New York: The Rosen
        Publishing Group Inc, 2003.

Armstrong, K., *Islam: A Short History*, New York: Random House Inc, 2000.

Asprey, R., *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History*, vol. 1, New York:
        Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1975.

Asprey, R., *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History*, vol. 2, New York:
        Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1975.

Bechtel, W and Richardson, R., *Discovering Complexity: Decomposition and Localization as Strategies in Scientific Research*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993.

Bell, J. Bowyer., *IRA tactics and Targets*, Dublin, Ireland: Poolberg, 1990.

Bishop, P and Mallie, E., *The Provisional IRA*, London: Corgi, 1987.

Bregman, A., *A History of Israel*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

Brewer, J, Guelke, A, Hume, I, Moxon-Browne, E and Wilford, R., *The Police Public Order and the State: Policing in Great Britain, Northern Ireland, The Irish Republic, The USA, Israel, South Africa and China*, Hong Kong: The MacMillan Press Ltd, 1988.

Brotons, A and Esposito, C., 'Spain' in Alexander, Y (ed.), *Combating Terrorism*, London: Croom Helm, 1982, pp. 163-186.

Burgat, F and Dowell, W., *The Islamic Movement in North Africa*, Austin, Texas: Centre for Middle Eastern Studies, University of Texas at Austin, 1997.

Calvert, P., 'Terrorism in Uruguay' in *International Encyclopedia of Terrorism*, London: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 1997, pp. 468-472.

Charters, D., 'Intelligence and Psychological Warfare Operations in Northern Ireland' in O'Day, A (ed.), *Dimensions of Irish Terrorism*, New York: G.K. Hall, 1987, pp 377-382.

Clark, R., *The Basque Insurgents ETA, 1952 – 1980*, Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1984.

Coogan, T, *The IRA*, London: Fontana/Collins, 1987.

Crenshaw, M., 'Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organisational Approaches' in Rapport, D (ed.), *Inside Terrorist Organisations*, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001, pp. 13-31.

Cronin, S., *Irish Nationalism*, Dublin: The Academy Press, 1980.

Crossley, N., *Making Sense of Social Movements*, Buckingham: Open University Press, 2002.

Dillon, M., *The Dirty War*, London: Arrow Books, 1991.

Ehrlich, R., 'State-Sponsored Terrorism: Terrorism as a Preferred Instrument of Syrian Policy' in *ICT Papers on Terrorism*, Herzliya, Israel: The International Policy Institute for Counter-terrorism, 2002, pp. 33-45.

Esposito, J. L., *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Feldman, A., *Formations of Violence: The Narrative of the Body and Political Terror in Northern Ireland*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991.

Forrester, J., *Principles of Systems*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Wright-Allen Press, Inc, 1968.

Freund, W., *Looking into Hamas and other constituents of the Palestinian-Israeli Confrontation*, Frankfurt, Germany: Peter Lang, 2002.

Gazit, S., 'Israel' in Alexander, Y (ed.), *Combating Terrorism,* London: Croom Helm, 1982, pp. 227-259.

Gearty, C., *Terror*, London: Faber, 1991.

Geraghty, T., *The Irish War: The Hidden Conflict Between the IRA and British Intelligence*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2000.

Gray, C., *Explorations in Strategy*, Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1996.

Greer, S., *Supergrasses: A Study in Anti-Terrorist Law Enforcement in Northern Ireland*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Guevara, C., *Guerrilla Warfare*, Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1985.

Hall, R., 'Violence and its effects on the Community' in O'Day, A (ed.), *Dimensions of Irish Terrorism*, New York: G.K. Hall, 1975, pp 149-160.

Heberle, R., *Social Movement: An Introduction to Political Sociology*, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts Inc, 1951.

Hroub, K., *Hamas,* Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000.

Irvin, C., *Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999.

Jean-Klein, I., 'Palestinian Militancy, Martyrdom and Nationalist Communities in the West Bank during the Intifada' in Pettigrew, J (ed.), *Martyrdom and Political Resistance: Essays from Asia and Europe*, Amsterdam, The Netherlands: VU University Press, 1997, pp. 85-110.

Jimenez, F., 'Spain: The Terrorist Challenge and the Government's Response' in Schmid, A and Crelinsten, R (eds), *Western Responses to Terrorism,* London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1993, pp. 110-130.

Katz, S., *The Hunt for the Engineer: How Israeli Agents Tracked the Hamas Master Bomber*, New York: Fromm International, 1999.

Kedourie, E., 'Political Terrorism in the Muslim World' in Netanyahu, B (ed.), *Terrorism: How the West can Win*, New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1987, pp. 70-76.

Kiesler, C., *The Psychology of Commitment: Experiments Linking Behaviour to Belief*, New York: Academic Press Inc, 1971.

Kitson, F., *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-keeping*, London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1971.

Krizan, L., *Joint Military College: Intelligence Essentials for Everyone: Occasional Paper Number Six*, Joint Military Intelligence College, Washington,DC, June 1999,

Laqueur, W., *A History of Terrorism*, New Brunswick, USA: Transaction Publishers, 2001.

Litvak, M., *The Islamization of Palestinian Identity: The Case of Hamas*, Tel Aviv, Israel: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1996.

MacClancy, J., 'To Die in the Basque Land: Martyrdom in Northern Iberia' in Pettigrew, J (ed.), *Martyrdom and Political Resistance: Essays from Asia and Europe*, Amsterdam, The Netherlands: VU University Press, 1997, pp. 111-128.

Macdonald, I., 'The Police System of Spain' in Roach, J and Thomaneck, J (eds), *Police and Public Order in Europe*, London: Croom Helm, 1985, pp. 215-254.

Mishal, S. and Sela, A., *The Palestinian Hamas, Vision Violence, and Coexistence*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.

Mommsen, W and Hirshfeld, G (eds), *Social Protest, Violence and Terror in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Europe*, London: The Macmillan Press   Ltd, 1982.

Morgan, D., 'The Assassins: A Terror Cult' in *International Encyclopedia of Terrorism*, London: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 1997, pp. 40-41.

Murray, R., 'Killings of Local Security Forces in Northern Ireland 1969-1981' in O'Day, A (ed.), *Dimensions of Irish Terrorism*, New York: G.K. Hall, 1984,   pp 105-146.

Netanyahu, B (ed.), *Terrorism: How the West can Win*, New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1987.

Neusse, A., *Muslim Palestine: The Ideology of Hamas*, Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1998.

Newsinger, J., *British Counterinsurgency: From Palestine to Northern Ireland*, New York: Palgrave, 2002.

O'Ballance, E., 'IRA Leadership Problems' in Wilkinson, P (ed.), *British   Perspectives of Terrorism*, London: Allen & Unwin, 1981, pp. 73-82.

O'Ballance, E*, Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism, 1979-95: The Iranian Connection*, London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1997.

O'Brien, B., *The Long War: The IRA and Sinn Fein 1985 to Today*, Dublin: The O'Brien Press, 1993.

O'Day, A (ed.), *Dimensions of Irish Terrorism*, New York: G.K. Hall, 1975.

Otte, T., 'Russian Anarchist Terror' in *International Encyclopedia of Terrorism*, London: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 1997, pp. 56-57.

Pettigrew, J (ed.), *Martyrdom and Political Resistance: Essays from Asia and Europe*, Amsterdam, The Netherlands: VU University Press, 1997.

Pluchinsky, D., 'Political Terrorism in Western Europe: Some Themes and Variations' in Alexander, Y and Myers, K (eds), *Terrorism in Europe*, London: Croom Helm, 1982, pp. 40-78.

Porzecanski, A., *Uruguay's Tupamaros: The Urban Guerrilla*, New York: Praeger, 1973.

Rees, M., 'Terror in Ireland and Britain's Response' in Wilkinson, P (ed.), *British Perspectives of Terrorism*, London: Allen & Unwin, 1981, pp. 83-88.

Rapoport, D., *Assassination and Terrorism*, Toronto, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1971.

Rapoport, D., (ed.), *Inside Terrorist Organisations*, London: Frank Cass Publishers,   2001.

Roach, J and Thomaneck, J (eds), *Police and Public Order In Europe*, London: Croom Helm, 1985.

Rose, C, Ferracuti, F, Horchem,H, Janke, P and Leaute,J., *Report of the International Commission in the Basque Country*, Gasteiz, Vitoria: Eusko Jaurlaritza, 1986.

Sluka, J., 'From Graves to Nations: Political Martyrdom and Irish Nationalism' in Pettigrew, J (ed.), *Martyrdom and Political Resistance: Essays from Asia and Europe*, Amsterdam, The Netherlands: VU University Press, 1997, pp. 35-60.

Sluka, J., *Death Squad: The Anthropology of State Terror*, Philadelphia, USA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000.

Sluka, J., 'For God and Ulster: The Culture of Terror and Loyalist Death Squads in Northern Ireland' in Sluka, J (ed.), *Death Squad: The Anthropology of State Terror*, Philadelphia, USA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000, pp. 127-157.

Stalker, J., *Stalker*, London: Chivers, 1988.

Stoney, J., 'Irish Terrorism Investigations' in O'Day, A (ed.), *Dimensions of Irish Terrorism*, New York: G.K. Hall, 1987, pp 371-376.

Sullivan, J., *ETA and Basque Nationalism: The Fight for Euskadi 1890-1986*, London: Routledge, 1988.

Taber, R., *The War of the Flea: Guerrilla Warfare Theory and Practice*, St Albans, UK: Paladin Frogmore, 1965.

Tarrow, S., *Power in Movement*, Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Taylor, P., *Behind the Mask: The IRA and Sinn Fein*, New York: TV Books, 1997.

Trevino, J., 'Spain's Internal Security: The Basque Autonomous Police Force' in Alexander, Y and Myers, K (eds), *Terrorism in Europe*, London: Croom Helm, 1982, pp. 141-153.

Trigg, R., *Reason and Commitment*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1973.

Urban, M., *Big Boys Rules: The Secret Struggle Against the IRA*, London: Faber and Faber Limited. 1992.

Von Borcke, A., 'Violence and Terror in Russian Revolutionary Populism: The Narodnaya Volya, 1879-83' in Mommsen, W and Hirshfeld, G (eds), *Social Protest, Violence and Terror in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Europe,* London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1982, pp. 48-62.

Wilkinson, P (ed.), *British Perspectives of Terrorism*, London: Allen & Unwin, 1981.

Woodworth, P., *Dirty War, Clean Hands: ETA, the Gal and Spanish Democracy*, Crosses Green Cork, Ireland: Cork University Press, 2001.

Wright, J., *Terrorist Propaganda: The Red Army Faction and The Provisional IRA 1968 - 1986*, New York: St Martin's Press, 1990.

Zirakzadeh, C., 'A Rebellious People: Basques, Protests, and Politics', (renamed Spain) in Whittaker, D (ed.), *The Terrorism Reader,* London: Routledge, 2001, pp. 125-138.

Zulaika, J., *Basque Violence Metaphor and Sacrament*, Nevada, U.S.A: University of Nevada Press, 1988.

Theses

Vercher, A., 'British and Spanish Measures to Deal with Terrorism: A Comparative Study with Some Reference to the EEC Framework', PhD Thesis, Cambridge University, 1988.

Interviews

Interviews by the author:

Dr John Tonkin-Covell, 8 May, 2003

Dr Jim Veech, 27 June, 2003

Dr Jeff Sluka, 23 September, 2003

Archival Interview Transcripts:

Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, interviewed by Mariam Shahin, December 2001
        retrieved 5 May 2003, from
        http://library.massey.ac.nz/findit/databases/databasesaz.htm (Military and
        Government Collection)

Appendix A: Research Definitions

Cell Capital: Compartmentalization

Compartmentalization: As a concept of terrorism, compartmentalization is best sub-categorised as territorial, operational and internal. Porzecanski defines compartmentalization in both the territorial and operational sense as the minimization of contact between terrorist cells, usually only through cell leaders and in which only the necessary information is supplied for the cell to remain operational[283]. Cells minimise contact to those assigned to their area of operations (territorial) and within their own cell specialisation (operational), for example logistics or strike cells. Internal compartmentalization refers to the minimisation of contact between cell members as determined by the 'need to know' philosophy. All three aspects of compartmentalization determine the cells operational security.

Solidarity: Tarrow states that solidarity is group recognition through a common interest[284].

Communications Discipline: The 'need to know' philosophy ensures that select individuals communicate information or intelligence sensitive to the security of the organisation in a timely and discrete manner to recipients per operational necessity.

Cell Capital: Leadership

Leadership: Tarrow describes leadership as the use of symbols, whether cultural or constructed such as embellishment, the redefinition or offsetting of grievances with solutions in order to mobilize the movement's supporters[285].

---

[283] Porzecanski, A., *Uruguay's Tupamaros: The Urban Guerrilla,* New York: Praeger, 1973, p. 33.
[284] Tarrow, S., *Power in Movement*, Cambridge, U.K; Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 5.
[285] Tarrow, p. 122.

Strategy: The Clauswitzian definition of strategy states, '…the use of engagements for the object of the war.'[286] Clauswitz's definition is used to define terrorist strategy within the context of this research.

Decentralisation of Control: Tarrow states, 'Sustaining a movement is the result of a delicate balance between suffocating the power in movement by providing too much organisation and leaving it to spin off uselessly away through the tyranny of decentralization.'[287] Consequently, devolving varying degrees of control to subordinate layers is a means to sustain the balance of power in the organisation between leadership and cells.

Cell Capital: Commitment

Kiesler's 1971 psychological study of commitment provides the basis for a definition of commitment in this study. Commitment is the '…pledging or binding of the individual to behavioural acts'[288]. It presupposes certain beliefs and involves a personal dedication to the actions implied[289]. The organisations strategy connects abstract beliefs with concrete actions. The greater ones commitment the more resistant ones abstract beliefs and past behaviour are to attacks[290]. Within this context, the following increases the degree of commitment:

- The degree of volition, particularly choice, given to the subject (the greater the freedom to act the more likely the subject is to infer his actions are his own, reducing pressure on the subject and increasing ones commitment)[291]
- The importance of the act for the subject (the greater the effort the greater ones commitment)[292]

---

[286] Gray, C., *Explorations in Strategy*, Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1996, p. 4.
[287] Tarrow, p. 190.
[288] Kiesler, C., *The Psychology of Commitment: Experiments Linking Behaviour to Belief*, New York: Academic Press Inc, 1971, p. 30.
[289] Trigg, R., *Reason and Commitment*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1973, p. 44.
[290] Kiesler, p. 31.
[291] Kiesler, p. 158.
[292] Kiesler, p. 172.

- The explicitness and degree of irrevocability of the act (The more public or unambiguous the act the greater ones resistance to conform, and hence the greater ones commitment)[293]

- The number of acts performed by the subject (attacks on the subject of inadequate strength drives the subject to more extreme behaviours in defence of his previous commitment. Consequently, as his attacks increase his commitment increases)[294]

Ultimately, terrorists who are able to attribute meaning to the act make subsequent acts self-supporting[295]. However, this component more than any other operates in a state of flux in response to feedback influences. Hence, it is the hardest to judge.

Ideology: An ideology details beliefs that are prescriptive and a product of social conflict that '…emerges when a section of society feels or perceives that its needs are not being met by the prevailing outlook.'[296] Its objective is to be a persuasive catalyst directing '…the progressive movement of an actor from the uncommitted audience to the sympathetic audience and then to the active audience.'[297] Its persuasiveness to make people act is a measure of its symbolic value to provide a substitute for unfulfilled needs.

Cell Capital: Organisational Formation

This represents the non-operational components of the organisation from which the cell is formed. It comprises three components including, popular support, recruitment and training.

Popular Support: Collective groups that each maintains varying degrees of commitment in support of the movement's ideology and/or strategy. Taber comments that the population is the key to the entire struggle, '…it is his camouflage, his quartermaster,

---

[293] Kiesler, p. 16.
[294] Kiesler, p. 88.
[295] Dingley, J and Kirk-Smith, M., 'Symbolism and Sacrifice in Terrorism', *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 13:1 (2002), pp 102-128, p. 107.
[296] Wright, J., *Terrorist Propaganda: The Red Army Faction and The Provisional IRA 1968 - 1986*, New York: St Martin's Press, 1990, p. 35.
[297] Wright, p. 166.

his recruiting office, his communications network, and his efficient, all-seeing intelligence service.'[298]

Recruitment: The recruitment filtering process is a mechanism to determine the commitment of potential recruits. It is a situational process that measures a level of despair and an internal process used to make character judgements. Generally, once the potential recruits experience with the protest cycle comes to an end he must then decide which organisation's strategy appeals the most[299]. For example, Irvin notes that militarists tend to be the most ethnic and suffer greatest from a loss of self-identity and self-worth whether from discrimination or other abuses; hence, they favour the armed struggle[300]. In this sense, Irvin uses the following rationalization for joining a terrorist organisation: 'Are the costs of an action likely to exceed the costs experienced with inaction? If anticipated costs are not expected to exceed the costs incurred normally, then the costs of participation roughly equal the costs of non-participation, and since the benefits of change clearly outweigh the benefits of inaction, rebellious collective action is undertaken.'[301]

Training: The initial and ongoing acquisition of terrorist skills and process of indoctrination in order that the terrorist may adequately sustain the tactics required of the strategy. Training may be formal, through distinct training programs carried out once only or informal, through ongoing programs such as mentoring.

---

[298] Taber, R., *The War of the Flea: Guerrilla Warfare Theory and Practice*, St Albans, UK: Paladin Frogmore, 1965, p. 22.
[299] Irvin, C., *Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Part in Ireland and the Basque Country*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999, p. 187.
[300] ibid.
[301] Irvin, p. 37.

Cell Capital: Operational Patterns

Operational patterns represent the operational component of the organisation from which components participate or contribute to tactical operations. It consists of three components including logistics, intelligence and attacks.

Logistics: Within the context of terrorist organisations logistics can be defined as the detailed co-ordination of resources through supply interfaces. The supply interface comprises external and internal primary and secondary supply chains linking external suppliers with logistics cells and linking internal supplies with active cells.

Intelligence: Krizan defines intelligence as:

> …being more than information. It is knowledge that has been specifically prepared for a customer's unique circumstances. The word knowledge highlights the need for human involvement. Intelligence collection systems produce data, not intelligence: only the human mind can provide that special touch that makes sense of data for different customer's requirements. The special processing that partially defines intelligence is the continual collection, verification, and analysis of information that allows us to understand the problem or situation in actionable terms and then tailor a product in the context of the customer's circumstances. If any of these essential attributes is missing, then the product remains information rather than intelligence.[302]

Regardless of the commercial connotations in this definition, it makes the important distinction between information and intelligence and the need for human involvement in order to produce an actionable result. In this sense, this definition is applicable to intelligence gathering mechanisms within both terrorist and counter-terrorism organisations.

Attacks: This represents the doctrine and tactics of the terrorist organisation or as Gray simply states, guidance on how to fight and what the forces actually do[303]. Tarrow states, 'Movements that continue to repeat the same actions run

---

[302] Krizan, L., *Joint Military College: Intelligence Essentials for Everyone: Occasional Paper Number Six*, Joint Military Intelligence College, Washington, DC, June 1999, p. 7.
[303] Gray, p. 5.

the risk of losing support and being ignored...'[304] Both intelligence and weapons variety and effectiveness significantly predetermine the tactics employed or tactical variety. In this sense, tactical variety reduces the risk associated to repeating same actions, consequently increasing attack effectiveness. In order, to judge tactical variety the doctrine and tactics of the terrorist organisation must be determined.

Cell Capital: Counter-terrorism Measures

The term counter-terrorism is often interchanged with anti-terrorism. It is therefore problematic to find consistent definitions of either term. The United States Federal Emergency Management Authority (FEMA) uses the following definition:

> Antiterrorism refers to defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of people and property to terrorist acts, while counterterrorism includes offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Thus, antiterrorism is an element of hazard mitigation, while counterterrorism falls within the scope of preparedness, response and recovery.[305]

However, both definitions involve information-gathering techniques that may be utilized for both defensive and offensive measures, for example anti-terrorism measures that introduces legislation allowing *Habeas Corpus* (the power to detain) or counter-terrorism measures that use technologies to track suspected terrorists. Simply, both counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism measures may produce actionable data. To avoid confusion this research will only utilize the term counter-terrorism, however it is recognized some measures may be considered anti-terrorism measures.

---

[304] Tarrow, p. 116.
[305] Federal Emergency Management Authority, 'Anti-terrorism', (2003), retrieved 12th September 2003, from http://www.fema.gov/fima/antiterrorism/